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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 In January 1942, with the United States reeling from the Japanese attack at Pearl 
Harbor, the German Navy struck at the heart of American vessels. While the Japanese 
forces challenged the might of the American military in the Pacific, the Germans focused 
on economically strangling the Allies by sinking their merchant ships in the Atlantic. The 
struggle to command the Atlantic pushed the Axis and Allied powers into an ever-
evolving game of cat and mouse, where German submersibles stalked and later fled from 
the American forces. This took both the Allies and Axis forces all across the Atlantic 
Ocean. The constant skirmishes between these two powers developed into the Battle of 
the Atlantic, as both sides looked to gain supremacy. The Atlantic Ocean represented an 
important stepping-stone for the Allies to end the war. The Allies needed full control of 
the Atlantic to organize the invasion of Europe, while the Germans saw the Atlantic as a 
barrier protecting Germany’s Western flank. The need for both the Allies and Axis 
powers to control the Atlantic caused the conflict to rage from the beginning of World 
War II in 1939 until the German surrender in 1945. 
The complexities of the Battle of the Atlantic forced the Allies to improve the 
tactics, technologies and training of their forces. The Battle of the Atlantic consisted of 
the truly devastating German submarines, known as U-Boats, and a rapidly improving 
Allied air force. Both these units discovered new methods of fighting and implemented 
more advanced technology to give them an edge in the Atlantic. Both the Axis and Allies 
developed more convoluted and intricate equipment. As a result, the operators needed 
more education to properly use them. Thus, a lack of trained personnel at times rendered 
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technological advances useless. Mastering the technologies and tactics of Atlantic patrols 
allowed for American pilots to help the Allies win the Battle of the Atlantic.  
In this Independent Study, I focus on the training of aircrews as the reason why 
the Allies ultimately won the Battle of the Atlantic. Most authors who write about the 
Battle of the Atlantic attribute victory to multiple factors, including training. However 
these historians only give the reader a glimpse of the complicated training situation. This 
thesis examines the different phases of training in regards to anti-submarine warfare, thus 
giving the reader a comprehensive look at another factor in the Allied conquest.  
As I previously stated, none of the prominent historians writing on the Battle of 
the Atlantic detailed the changes of training for anti-submarine aircrews. These different 
books discuss multiple topics, and therefore aspects like training lack the necessary 
explanation that would allow for a comprehensive understanding into the importance of 
the human element. My Independent Study reinforces the current belief that training 
helped win the Battle of the Atlantic, but I have also gone further to explain why and 
how. I describe specific curriculums and how the level of training coincided with 
different stages of the Battle of the Atlantic. The Battle of the Atlantic held a key part of 
the Second World War where both sides worked to control the ocean. Therefore, 
improving the Allied aircrews held a key component in winning the Battle of the 
Atlantic. 
 The historians who write about the Battle of the Atlantic only award partial credit 
to Allied training for the Allied victory in the Atlantic. These authors explain the 
importance of the men involved in the conflict as a reason for the Allies’ victory in the 
Battle of the Atlantic. For example, S.W. Roskill, the author of the multi-volume War at 
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Sea, explains how endurance, skill and moral purpose of the men became pivotal in the 
outcome of the battle. He stated that since the Battle of the Atlantic contained “no limits 
in time or space,” and the battlefield had no specific boundaries, the drive of the men won 
the battle. Thus, Roskill touches on the importance of training in the final victory. He 
states how technology simply aided the men as they fought the U-Boats.1  
    Another author, David Syrett, strongly attributes German failures in explaining 
the Allied superiority in the Atlantic. He first states that the German high command never 
discovered an effective way in countering the Allied convoy system. The inability for 
German U-Boats to make a successful attack on a convoy prevented the U-Boats from 
achieving their number one objective, to cripple the Allied economies. Syrett explains 
that in both World War I and II the Germans needed to develop a better strategy for 
sinking the Allied merchant vessels due to the effectiveness of the Allied convoy system.2  
Secondly, Syrett explains that the Germans inadequacies in intelligence work hurt 
their chances of success. The U-Boats had incomplete knowledge of convoy routes in the 
Atlantic because most commanders only had information from deciphered radio 
messages from the Allies. Once the Allies changed their code, the Germans had to rely on 
their air command, the Luftwaffe, for sea locations. Unfortunately for the Germans, the 
coordination between the air and land branches lacked any cooperation.  
David Syrett goes on to describe technological faults for the German defeat. The 
U-Boat, although improved from the model in the First World War, still contained 
obvious flaws. The Germans never fixed the problem of making their submersibles more 
                                                
1 S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea: II, 355. 
2 David Syrett, The Defeat of the German U-Boat: The Battle of the Atlantic, 259. 
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submarine like.3 A submersible, like a submarine, has the ability to submerge itself 
beneath the water. However, a submarine, in contrast to a submersible, can operate 
effectively underwater. Once a U-Boat sunk below the water, many of their abilities 
became inefficient. For example, the speed of a U-Boat underwater decreased to such a 
level that even the slowest merchant ship outran it.  
Syrett finally explains that the German military never took advantage of scientific 
researchers to improve their forces. This made ASWORG, an American organization 
devoted to scientific analysis to improve weapons and strategies, that much more 
important since Germany failed to implement a similar force. Syrett touched on the 
importance of improvement through scientific thought. The Germans lacked essential 
advice on how to fix current techniques or tactics. Without an organized group devoted to 
researching and analyzing U-Boat strategies, the Germans had no chance to use their 
machines to its full potential. 
The last prominent author on the Battle of the Atlantic, Samuel Morison in his 
book, The Battle of the Atlantic, weighed in on how the Allies achieved victory in the 
Battle of the Atlantic. He explained that no ‘one’ answer could describe how the Allies 
won. Instead, he writes that we must look to several different reasons that together, 
pushed the German U-Boats back. These reasons included better technology, tactics, 
resources and training. He then builds a connection between all of the aspects above, 
explaining, “Coastal convoys were impossible without more escorts and patrol planes; 
ships were ineffective without proper detection devices and offensive weapons; these in 
                                                
3 Syrett, 259-264. 
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turn needed operators trained in special schools…”4 This explanation shows a certain 
correlation between training and other factors as a reason why the Allies won the Battle 
of the Atlantic. Therefore the Allies’ focus on training helped them not only control the 
Atlantic Ocean, but also attain total victory in World War II 
 Both the Axis and Allies focused on the Atlantic Ocean because the Battle of the 
Atlantic influenced future operations in the Second World War. For the Allies, safety in 
the Atlantic permitted European operations. The Allies needed to transport equipment 
and soldiers to open a new front in Europe.5 The Axis powers saw the Atlantic as a way 
to tie down Allied resources and to prevent a European invasion.6 The Battle of the 
Atlantic represented a first line of defense in the war. Whoever controlled the Atlantic 
had the ability to coordinate more devastating attacks on the other. Thus, the victor in 
World War II needed to win the Battle of the Atlantic. To do this, every country worked 
to advance their armed forces. Besides improvements in personnel, technology helped to 
give the Allies an advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic. 
 In the Great War, from 1914 until 1919, technology entered a new domain; its 
successes motivated every military force to further develop its weapons. In World War II, 
the experimental technologies of the early 20th century took incredible leaps forward. 
Technology in the field of battle caused a drastic change in strategy. Weapons like the 
tank, airplane and submarine entered World War I as an improved way to achieve 
victory. The first tank, known as a “land ship” first fought in the Battle of Flers-
Courcelette in 1916, as a way to cross enemy trenches. Although the tank struggled to 
                                                
4 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of 
the Atlantic: September 1939- May 1943. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), 203-204. 
5 Richard Hough, 306. 
6 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic: 
September 1939- May 1943, 402. 
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operate effectively, they overpowered German defenses.7 Airplanes held observational 
and attacking roles in the First World War. Each country created its own air unit years 
before 1914 and as a result their uses aided each side during the entirety of the war. 8 The 
U-Boat, like airplanes, existed years before the First World War and similar to the tank, 
needed further development to operate at a level of superiority.9 All three of these 
weapons changed the doctrines of battle and military strategies. A new form of warfare 
emerged and like the technology, the crews of each weapon needed to master the 
instruments to fight at an optimum level. In a sphere where machinery expected to enter 
with the certainty of ascendancy, the military needed their personnel to improve too. This 
meant that those operating advanced equipment had to learn their respective machines. In 
the Battle of the Atlantic, pilots proceeded to master their airplanes and the technology 
inside. Only when man and machine both worked harmoniously, did they evolve into an 
effective entity. 
 After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, America entered a war unprepared to 
defend its shores. America did not have enough pilots to effectively patrol their Eastern 
coastline. The trained aircrews in both the Navy and Army Air Force operated in the 
Pacific theater due to the immediate problems from the Japanese.10 The crews that 
patrolled the Atlantic Ocean had little training, if any, in anti-submarine operations. 
These men made many mistakes that cost the Allies tons of supplies needed in the war 
effort. 
                                                
7 William Philpott, Three Armies on the Somme: The First Battle of the Twentieth Century 332-333. 
8 Lee Kennett, The First Air War 1914-1918 218-221. 
9 William Archer, The Pirate’s Progress: A Short History of the U-Boat xi-1. 
10 The Aviation History Unit, The Navy’s Air War: A Mission Completed (New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers), 29. 
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 American pilots made numerous mistakes in the first few months of the war. 
Pilots sent to protect the coast conducted missions in a completely unfamiliar setting 
from where they trained. Army Air Force pilots, untrained in anti-submarine patrols, 
picked up the slack for the Navy in anti-submarine operations.11 It took time for Army 
Air Force pilots to learn how to conduct searches and attacks on this new enemy from 
scratch.   
 Non-military personnel also joined the U-Boat war. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) 
consisted mostly of men unfit for service, since most able-bodied men joined the military. 
This included those above and below the age limit, and those with a physical ailment that 
prohibited them from joining the military.12 With the equipment the Civil Air Patrol had, 
they helped the war effort tremendously. However, when it came to attacking U-Boats, 
CAP pilots did not have the needed training to understand how to improve on their 
abilities. 
 The training programs in the military also failed in preparing incoming pilots for 
the complexities of anti-submarine operations. Early American training facilities, during 
World War II, had not prepared for the immense increase in students and therefore they 
lacked the resources to train.13 These programs worked to reorganize themselves in order 
to create a clear and concise path for their pilots in training to follow.  
After months of overall failures in anti-submarine warfare, the Army and Navy 
called on the brilliant and relatively untapped minds of American scientists. The military 
                                                
11 Office of Air Force History, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations: 
January 1939 To August 1942. (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 521. 
12 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic: 
September 1939- May 1943, 276. 
13 H.H. Arnold, First Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War, 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947) 313. 
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hired civilian scientists to analyze the shameful situation in the Atlantic and to give the 
military advice.14 Researchers concluded that Allied pilots did not properly use the 
technologies, techniques and tactics essential for protecting Allied cargo ships. Only after 
operations researchers studied the low amounts of U-Boats sunk did the American 
military realize what to teach all of their pilots. 
 When it came to technology, aircrews did not use their depth charges effectively 
until the analysts made recommendations. A weapon first created for use on ships, the 
depth charge had a deeper detonation setting. On a ship, this later setting allowed for the 
Allied vessel to travel out of range before the charge exploded. When the depth charges 
moved to airplanes, this previous setting failed to damage a majority of their targets 
because aircrews dropped their charges on top of a patrolling U-Boat. The deeper setting 
that the Allies used for protecting their ships, instead allowed for the U-Boat to escape 
from harm.15 Operations researchers discovered that a shallow charge exploded at a lethal 
distance more often. 
 The Army and Naval air forces, like anti-submarine technologies, also neglected 
proper technique in the first few months of 1942. The ways in which an airplane flew and 
attacked a U-Boat, allowed for their target to get away. Too often Allied aircrews 
initiated their attack run when they realized that the U-Boat had already started to safely 
submerge making it unlikely for these aircrews to make an effective strike.16 The next 
                                                
14 Philip M. Morse, “The Beginnings of Operations Research in the United States,” Operations Research 
34, no. 1 (January 1986): 11. 
15 Charles Sternhell and Alan Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, (Washington, D.C., 
1946) 137. 
16 Professor C.H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U-Boat (London: 
Unwin Brothers Limited, 1973), 151. 
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aspect of the Battle of the Atlantic that scientists studied enabled pilots to make a surprise 
attack on a German submarine. This included camouflage and baiting techniques. 
 The method of searching for a U-Boat also joined with technologies and 
techniques as an aspect of anti-submarine warfare in need of improvement. What use 
would an effective attack run and proper weapons settings have if aircrews could not 
locate the U-Boats on route to the American coastline? Operations researchers analyzed 
the best pattern to search for U-Boats and the length of each mission. Specifically, these 
scientists found out the impact that altitude had on spotting an enemy submarine.17 
 In the end, operations researchers transformed anti-submarine warfare during 
World War II and they also demonstrated how training positively influenced Allied 
effectiveness in the Battle of the Atlantic. The discoveries made by civilian analysts not 
only modified what training programs taught, but they also introduced new material for 
these facilities. Anti-submarine warfare was a relatively new concept for America, 
especially on the scale at which they had to fight. Operations analysts studied an 
unfamiliar battle and their discoveries added much needed information for every Allied 
pilot, both in training and in the field.18    
 The analysis made by civilian scientists combined with the improvements of 
training commands developed an air arm ready for anti-submarine operations. Aircrews, 
with improved training, attacked more U-Boats, sank more U-Boats and the lethal 
                                                
17 Professor C.H. Waddington, 162. 
18 The Army Air Force Antisubmarine Command published a monthly summary report on anti-submarine 
operations. Some of the chapters detailed the problems with aircrew attacks or new techniques to try. I 
placed a more descriptive synopsis of these reports in the annotated bibliography. 
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percentage of each attack increased greatly.19 After August 1943, Allied forces controlled 
the Atlantic Ocean and merchant vessels traveled to their destinations safely.  
 For the United States, once the Battle of the Atlantic began, they struggled to 
defend their territory. A lack of training contributed to the inadequate protection made by 
American pilots. Aircrews had little knowledge in anti-submarine operations or how to 
use the technologies onboard. Only after the United States focused on building up anti-
submarine personnel, did they subdue the German U-Boats. 
 In an ever-evolving battle that cost the Allies millions of dollars, the Battle of the 
Atlantic showed its relevance in winning the Second World War. After the Allied victory 
against the U-Boat, the United States targeted the European mainland. Although 
advances in technology and proper implementation of airplanes helped to defeat the 
German submarines, without trained aircrews patrolling the Atlantic the Battle would 
have raged on for much longer. The Allies needed to learn how to use the technology 
available in order to increase the strength of the American defenses. 
                                                
19 Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, August 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report,  
August 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/, 23. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC: 
A LOOK AT THE CONFLICT1 
 
Both the Axis and Allied powers saw the significance in controlling the seas, and 
more specifically, the Atlantic Ocean. Since the Atlantic separated the United States and 
Great Britain, the ability to trade effectively depended on who dominated the waters. 
Also, considering the fact that the English Channel divided Great Britain and Nazi 
occupied France, naval dominance affected the competence of an invading force. The 
importance of the Atlantic compelled both countries to send their forces in an attempt to 
gain full control. The subsequent conflict evolved into the Battle of the Atlantic.  
The Battle of the Atlantic matched the newly reinforced Allies against a uniquely 
altered German Navy. Germany, a landlocked country had little hope in building a 
surface Navy powerful enough to fight Great Britain. In response to this weakness, they 
capitalized on their experimental use in submarines from World War I. Germany 
commissioned hundreds of these U-Boats to take part in patrolling the Atlantic for Allied 
ships, later named the Battle of the Atlantic. Germany improved on the technologies and 
strategies of the German submarines implemented during the Great War, thus making 
them a lethal force.  
The German U-Boats served as Nazi Germany’s best weapon in the Atlantic, 
despite their difference with traditional surface vessels. The damage a U-Boat dealt came 
                                                
1 For this chapter I used mainly secondary sources to provide information into who, what, where, when, 
why and how of the Battle of the Atlantic. This chapter provides essential background information in the 
battle, thus allowing me to argue my point effectively. One primary source that I utilized in this chapter 
was Samuel Morison’s Battle of the Atlantic. He saw the immense effort involved in the Battle of the 
Atlantic and wrote about the Battle’s complexities. 
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from their torpedoes. This self-guided weapon moved towards other objects and exploded 
on contact. Early in the war, compressed air propelled the torpedoes. This method created 
a trail behind the torpedo that allowed for the evasive maneuvers of Allied ships.2 Since 
Germany improved their escaping and attacking capabilities in the first months of the 
war, the U-Boats harassed and sank hundreds of Allied ships. Also, because U-Boats took 
the initiative in Atlantic operations in 1940 and later in 1942, the field of battle changed 
in favor of the German submarines. The change in scenery and tactics bought the 
Germans more time as a superior force in the Atlantic. But, in time, the German U-Boats 
suffered from technological stagnation. Admiral Doenitz, the German commander of the 
U-Boat arm, categorized the German U-Boat as a diving vessel instead of the popular 
impression that this ship functioned forcefully under water.3  
German U-Boats acted less like submarines and more like submersibles, making 
them a useless weapon underwater. A submarine describes a ship that can navigate 
underwater, while a submersible only has the ability to submerge itself. Although a U-
Boat can in fact navigate underwater, its incapability to maneuver and its lack of speed 
most likely explained the Admiral Doenitz’s characterization.4 Once a U-Boat operated 
below the surface, their effectiveness decreased dramatically. Specifically their 
movement and attacking capabilities worsened. Underneath the surface a U-Boat moved 
slower than even the slowest merchant vessel. More often then not, a patrolling aircraft 
protected countless cargo ships, simply because they flew over a U-Boat as it tried to get 
close to a convoy. Due to the poor capabilities of a U-Boat underwater, commanders 
needed to operate on the surface in many cases. This created a favorable opportunity for 
                                                
2 David Mason, U-Boat the Secret Menace, (New York: Ballantine Books Inc. 1968) 15. 
3 Mason, 14. 
4 Henceforth I will refer to the submarines as submersibles. 
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Allied aircrews since they could only find and attack a U-Boat on the surface of the 
water. Above the water, U-Boats could manage to sail at a brisk seventeen knots, faster 
than an Allied cargo ship. On the other hand, once the U-Boat submerged its speed 
slowed to three knots. This rendered them incapable of catching even the slowest Allied 
ship.5 The inadequacy of the U-Boat to operate effectively beneath the surface gave the 
Allies a key advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Allies first needed to counter the 
German U-Boat tactics.  
Before America entered the Second World War, German submersibles attacked 
lone merchant vessels independently. This battle doctrine gave the Germans early 
successes in the war. The Germans enjoyed early victories with this strategy due to the 
carelessness of the Allied navies to develop new technology and tactics in the thirty years 
between World Wars.6 With little or no protection from other vessels, German 
submersibles sank countless merchant ships. U-Boats preyed on merchant vessels that 
operated without protective support because merchant ships lacked defensive 
technologies, making battles with U-Boats one sided. Only when the Allies implemented 
effective countermeasures did the German Navy change their strategy. 
The Allies chose to implement escort vessels, which had the capability of sinking 
a U-Boat, as a key countermeasure to protect a merchant ship. Unfortunately, this tactic 
took time to organize because of the scarce number of resources available for protective 
missions. America, like Great Britain, clung to a traditionalist idea pertaining to the 
future of their respective navies. The United States’ built their naval forces under the 
                                                
5 Andrew Roberts, The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War, (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2011) 359. 
6 Edward Von der Porten, The German Navy in World War II. (New York: Galahad Books, 1969), 168. 
 14 
direction of a “big gun in a big ship.” As a result, the American Navy had scarce amounts 
of escort and smaller vessels needed in anti-submarine operations.7   
It took some time before Great Britain realized the best strategy against the 
German submersibles. Early in the war the British military ordered their Navy to go on 
the offensive and to search for any U-Boat across the Atlantic. This meant that less 
resources and ships were available to protect the merchant vessels.8 Great Britain needed 
to find the best way to stop Germany’s success against their merchant ships.  
To prevent the U-Boat from sinking any more merchant vessels, British 
commanders implemented a convoy system to protect cargo ships. Convoys existed long 
before the Second World War, and the Allies used this tactic quite often during the First 
World War to combat the U-Boats.9 A convoy joined several different cargo ships going 
to the same destination with escort ships. These escorts surrounded the merchant vessels 
and deterred any U-Boat from attacking them. In response, the Germans began to attack 
convoys with several U-Boats simultaneously.  
These groups of U-Boats, known as “Wolf Packs,” spread out and fired at 
convoys making their protection techniques ineffective. In these “Wolf Packs” one single 
U-Boat spotted a convoy and would alert all nearby submersibles to converge at their 
position. The Allies needed to either track U-Boats before they got in lethal range or have 
one of the ships in the convoy keep the submersibles occupied by patrolling the waters 
where they spotted a U-Boat. The improvement of radar and other detection technologies 
served to help any ship avoid a U-Boat. Airplanes helped the Allied convoys by keeping 
the submersibles busy before they reached their destination.  
                                                
7 Gilbert Cant, America’s Navy in World War II. (New York: The John Day Company, 1943) 285. 
8 Roberts, 356. 
9 Marc Milner, Battle of the Atlantic (Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2003), 9. 
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Aircraft helped patrol the Atlantic Ocean to aid in a battle whose frontlines 
extended for thousands of miles. Since the submersible could hide below the surface, it 
turned into a hard target to find, let alone sink even for convoys. Aircraft solved the 
problems of having to search for a patrolling U-Boat. Airplanes achieved a greater 
distance and speed than surface vessels. Once an airplane caught a U-Boat they could call 
for ships and even other airplanes to join in the fight. Both sides understood the 
importance of air power and used planes for reconnaissance and for attacking. This made 
the Battle of the Atlantic more than just a naval engagement.    
The break away from the cliché naval battles, where battleships fought at close 
range as seen a century before, forced the Allies to change from their traditional 
strategies to more contemporary ones, which involved the implementation of aircraft as a 
crucial actor in the battle. These new methods of naval engagements pushed the Allies to 
both improve on existing weapons and to develop new ways to fight an elusive enemy. In 
response, Germany expanded and strengthened their U-Boats to counter new Allied 
advancements. The constant evolution of new technologies and policies by both sides 
created a seesaw of advancement that forced both the Allied and Axis powers to plot their 
next tactical move. 
 Merchant shipping emerged as the focus of this battle, and therefore the reason 
why both sides searched for any advantage. The Allies attempted to protect their cargo 
ships in order to continue the war effort. The Germans used their resources to sink the 
cargo ships in a struggle to starve the Allies. As their objective, Germany attacked 
merchant vessels moving toward England, in an attempt to destroy Allied trade routes. In 
the first few years of the war, Germany succeeded in their goal of strangling Great Britain 
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economically. Without a secure ocean, the American and British forces could not hope to 
deal a decisive blow against Nazi Germany. For the Germans, this battle protected their 
acquired lands in Western Europe. The Allies would not dare to invade Nazi occupied 
Europe when submersibles still patrolled the Atlantic Ocean effectively. In the first few 
years of World War II, Great Britain worried about her future. 
 Less than a year after the Second World War began, the Allies performed at a 
disadvantage. With Germany’s conquest of France and the Low Countries in 1940, the 
German Navy had three thousand miles of coastline to operate in, instead of the three 
hundred miles restricted to Germany before the war began.10 Thus, German forces evaded 
the English Channel. The channel became an effective bottleneck against the U-Boat 
because the British ships could better find and attack the U-Boats in the concentrated 
waters that separated Germany and the Atlantic Ocean. These submersibles functioned 
effectively in the Atlantic Ocean against the British military and economy because they 
operated throughout the Atlantic. Conducting naval operations against this new kind of 
weapon did not overly concern British commanders and therefore the amount of change 
necessary did not occur.11  
 With this disability of fighting the Germans across thousands of miles, Great 
Britain relied on her ally across the Atlantic. The United States Government agreed to 
help the British Empire against the Axis powers while still staying neutral. Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill appealed to the Americans for support, explaining how the 
German U-Boats have strangled Great Britain’s economy.12 The United States helped 
                                                
10 Richard Hough, The Longest Battle. (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc, 1986,) 37 
11 Hough, 12. 
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their ally by trading fifty old destroyers for British bases overseas.13 These ships helped 
the British forces in their convoy formations that protected their merchant ships. The 
United States benefitted from this trade since the destroyers exchanged had little use for 
America. The United States, at the time, had not declared war on the Axis powers. Their 
resources had not been stretched like it’s soon to be ally, Great Britain. 
 The Battle of the Atlantic took both the Allies and Axis powers to places far from 
their bases. The German U-Boats operated off the coasts of England, France, United 
States, Caribbean, Newfoundland and Western Africa. At the beginning of the war, the 
German submersibles took advantage of the unprepared Allies, stretching their resources. 
Their U-Boats sailed from one coast to another with little worry of being sunk. Once 
Allied forces realized the potential of aircraft along with its sharpened abilities, U-Boats 
had to patrol waters unavailable to aircrews. Finding a gap that prevented Allied forces 
from unleashing their airplanes allowed the U-Boats to remain effective even though the 
Allies surpassed their elusive tactics. The Mid-Atlantic gap, an area in the Northern 
Atlantic out of range of Allied airplanes, became the final sphere of this extensive battle. 
It took the Allies roughly six months to close this pocket, ending a conflict that lasted 
almost as long as the war itself. 
Airplanes enabled the Allies to add different and more effective weaponry to the 
battle. Unlike battleships, airplanes could search further distances and safely operate 
above the water. Even if an airplane failed to sink a submersible, their presence scared 
the U-Boat enough that it submerged. The advantages of aircraft included their ability to 
search, find, and attack any ship on the surface of the water. Once a submersible sank 
below the water, aircrews had little power to damage them. Also important, the U-Boat 
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had little power against the Allies when they operated underwater. The inabilities of the 
German submersibles to operate productively beneath the surface allowed for more 
effective Allied countermeasures.  
America spent a large amount of time and money to fight and eventually win the 
Battle of the Atlantic. Lieutenant Commander Samuel Morison, a naval historian who 
served during World War II, commented that, “The amount of study, energy and expense 
necessary to combat a few hundred enemy submersibles is appalling.”14 Fiscally, he 
states that in counting the ships and time lost in the Battle of the Atlantic the Allies spent, 
“…some hundreds of billions of dollars…”15 
In a battle that took many years and that occurred all over the Atlantic, each side 
incorporated different resources in an attempt to gain an upper hand. Technological 
advances, intelligence information and even the proper application of aircraft drastically 
helped both sides in the battle. A less publicized aspect that bolstered the Allied Atlantic 
force was aircrew training. What use did technology have if the men operating them 
could not use them effectively? Only when aircrews and airplanes operated harmoniously 
did they destroy the U-Boat menace. In England, Winston Churchill described Great 
Britain’s conflict with the German U-Boat, “Such is the U-Boat war – hard, widespread 
and bitter, a war of groping and drowning, a war of ambuscade and stratagem, a war of 
science and seamanship.”16 In a campaign that took place on a battlefield the size of the 
Atlantic Ocean, the ideas of a simple battle were thrown out. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 THE SECOND HAPPY TIME: 
THE FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE THE U-BOAT1 
 
“After years of blackout conditions in Europe the [American] shoreline looked 
like a carnival.”2 Marc Milner, a historian on the Battle of the Atlantic, made this 
comment to describe the reaction of the first U-Boat commanders operating in American 
waters. The stunning realization, that America lacked the preparation for anti-submarine 
warfare, made by the U-Boat commanders represented America’s failure to anticipate the 
German onslaught. The inability to fully develop anti-submarine defenses afflicted 
America’s shipping once the first U-Boats attacked. The United States soon recognized 
that their current strategies were ineffective against the submersible menace. The amount 
of cargo sunk in the first couple months of the war and the gross failure of attacks on U-
Boats compelled the German forces to call this offensive the “second happy time.” The 
first, being off the English coast in 1940 when the U-Boats decimated English shipping. 
The German submersible force under Admiral Karl Doenitz enjoyed relative ease 
in slaughtering Allied merchant vessels because the aircrews protecting these merchant 
ships lacked proper training. The Allies needed to improve aircraft technologies, and 
increase the amount resources for anti-submarine warfare, but they also needed to train 
their pilots in newer techniques that readied them for anti-submarine operations. Many of 
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the aviators assigned to patrol the Atlantic Ocean for U-Boats never practiced in the 
techniques of anti-submarine warfare. Also, most of the tactics of anti-submarine 
operations had yet to be discovered. After actual patrols, the United States military 
noticed the failures of aircrews. These inadequacies allowed for the German submersibles 
to stalk and sink Allied merchant vessels.  
Since the German submersibles surprised the American defensive forces, U-Boats 
sank a massive amount of merchant cargo. From January until April 1942, America’s 
Eastern Coast, known as the Eastern Sea Frontier, took the most damage. Between these 
months, the Allies lost an average of over 20 ships and over 120,000 gross tons of cargo.3 
After April 1942, the Germans began to move towards America’s Southern Coast. In this 
area the Germans sunk an average of twenty-six ships a month and over 125,000 gross 
tons of cargo.4 A failure of training the pilots in effective anti-submarine tactics led to the 
large loss of cargo and, more importantly, the survival of the German submersible force. 
When examining the failures of aircrews, I focus on the attacks made on the U-
Boats and the amount of German submersibles sunk. German U-Boats, for the most part, 
submerged at the first sight of an airplane. This prevented aircrews from sinking the 
submersible. While underwater, a U-Boat moved at such a sluggish speed that merchant 
vessels got away safely.5 When the aircrews missed their target, the submersibles simply 
reemerged and stalked the next vessel. Under these circumstances, it did not matter how 
much training the pilots received. This game of cat and mouse could have gone on for 
years because of the insignificant damage dealt to the U-Boats or the Allied airplanes. 
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Only after the aircrews started to attack these German forces effectively, did U-Boat 
commanders weigh their options on retreating. Regrettably, months passed before 
competent attacks pushed the German forces away from the Western Atlantic.    
In the first half of 1942, American aviators, ordered to protect the United States’ 
shoreline, failed to do their duty because they lacked adequate training in anti-submarine 
operations. Anti-submarine warfare evolved throughout the Battle of the Atlantic; thus 
every pilot needed updates on how to conduct these operations. Specifically in anti-
submarine operations, search and attack methods changed constantly. The United States 
had to improve their current technologies in order to get an edge in the Battle of the 
Atlantic. The complexities of anti-submarine warfare also caused the Allies to discover 
new tactics and techniques useful in destroying U-Boats. The progress of anti-submarine 
methods that were developed and enhanced, forced every pilot to continuously train in 
new approaches to combat. Even trained Naval aviators before Pearl Harbor needed 
experience in anti-submarine operations to improve their abilities. At the beginning of the 
war, American pilots had little knowledge in the proper ways of patrolling the Atlantic. 
Only after both pilots and scientists could observe the battle more closely, did pilots learn 
how to effectively attack and sink the Axis submersibles. Even though the current 
strategies needed improvement, the Navy had the best training for this kind of warfare.  
At first, Navy did its best to protect the coast. Unfortunately the Navy lacked the 
proper organization of their training commands, which hindering communication 
between divisions and the establishment of a single lesson plan. Besides this problem, the 
Navy withdrew from the Atlantic because of Japan’s successes in the Pacific. This left 
other pilots, untrained in Naval engagements, as defenders against a well-prepared U-
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Boat force. The first of these pilots were from the Army Air Corps later renamed the 
Army Air Force. 
The Army Air Force only had jurisdiction in land-based operations, making 
Atlantic patrols an unknown area of operations. Also the Army Air Corps needed to 
reform its organization to better prepare the cadets. Pilots rushed through training to 
increase the number of aircrews available. This drastic move for growth of the Army Air 
Corps confused Allied commanders in charge of training. Besides these faults, all Army 
Air Force pilots went through preflight and flight training, which taught the pilots how to 
effectively fly their airplanes, unlike the Civil Air Patrol. 
The Civil Air Patrol, an air unit comprised of American civilians, joined the Army 
Air Force as a unit devoted to anti-submarine patrols but these civilian pilots never had 
training in anti-submarine operations. The Civil Air Patrol worked to take the pressures 
off the military pilots ordered to search the coastline. Although this group greatly boosted 
the security off the American coast, the members of the Civil Air Patrol lacked eligibility 
for military duty. The United States, in the first few months of 1942, expected these pilots 
to only search for U-Boats and communicate with the military so that the Army and Navy 
Air Forces could attack them. Over time, the Civil Air Patrol pilots began carrying bombs 
and depth charges to engage the German submersibles.6 Due to the lack of training in 
anti-submarine warfare, these civilian pilots had little success in destroying the German 
U-Boats. A successful unit needed to master the tactics and technologies of anti-
submarine warfare. 
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For every pilot, the advancement of anti-submarine technologies hurt their ability 
to patrol the Atlantic because of the slow speed it took to implement new technologies in 
American airplanes. The United States barely started to improve the detection and 
attacking technologies on their airplanes, making a majority of pilots rely on their 
untested abilities in the Atlantic. Also, once the military added new technologies to the 
airplane, pilots still needed to learn the ins and outs of these machines. In some cases the 
pilots failed to apply these technologies correctly.  
All of these reasons mentioned above interfered with America’s attempts to 
thwart the German submersibles. These examples share a common theme: that the United 
States did not have much knowledge in modern anti-submarine operations when they 
joined their British Allies in the Second World War. Due to that fact, the Allies lost a 
significant amount of merchant vessels and cargo. 
From the beginning of World War II, the United States fought an up-hill battle to 
secure the Atlantic Ocean. After the unexpected attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States 
entered into a war that it was not entirely prepared to wage. Japan invaded the Philippines 
after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, forcing America to deploy its forces to the 
Pacific. The American citizenry later realized that not just Japan, but also Germany 
advanced into U.S. territory. In the hopes of disrupting the United States’ trade routes and 
decreasing the amount of resources sent to Great Britain, the German Navy ordered their 
experienced and menacing U-Boats to attack merchant vessels on America’s Eastern 
coast. The German attack, known as Operation Drumbeat, sent several U-Boats to prey 
on the defenseless Allied vessels in the Atlantic.7 Pilots resisted the incursion and ordered 
                                                
7 Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1990), xvii. 
 24 
patrols to search for any German vessel. The Navy operated with a diminutive air force of 
trained personnel, but not even proper schooling qualified them for the task at hand.   
Experienced pilots still required more guidance to accurately attack German U-
Boats. Throughout the Battle of the Atlantic, pilots worked with newer technologies and 
tested different tactics. Even though having an experienced aircrew strengthened 
American defenses, much more than the cadets just out of flying school, they still had 
much to learn. Anti-submarine warfare calls for special skills of the pilots in order for 
them to have a significant impact.  
Air forces that conducted anti-submarine operations had different equipment and 
tactics than aviators trained in dog fighting, where two planes fought to destroy each 
other, or area bombing, where a plane dropped several bombs on a ground target. Samuel 
Morison, a prominent World War II Naval historian writes, “Both Navies recognized 
early in the war that normal naval training was not enough to qualify sailors to hunt and 
kill submarines; special training was required not only in tactics, but in radar, sonar, 
depth-charging, air-bombing, and the use of a variety of weapons.”8 When the United 
States entered World War II, American aviators could not conduct anti-submarine 
operations at a maximum level. They did not have the specific training, a general 
doctrine, or experience to properly teach students the efficient techniques to sink a U-
Boat. 
Proper schooling helped pilots in their mission, but experience further improved 
these same pilots. Experience gave pilots key information that they did not previously 
realize. The more missions a pilot went on allowed the military to accurately see what 
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attack methods worked, and how the U-Boat responded to these strikes. In early 
campaigns, like the German thrust against the American coast, aviators did not have any 
familiarity with this relatively new kind of warfare. The most efficient procedures, “had 
to be learned through actual experience, and, owning to the urgent need for 
Antisubmarine patrols, the air units were forced to accomplish their training in the course 
of operational missions.”9 Since pilots in their first few missions never practiced in the 
kind of warfare expected from them, they made many mistakes. Despite a lack of 
experience, trained Naval aircrews had a major advantage over the other pilots because 
the Navy provided classes that prepared their cadets for patrol bombing missions. 
Naval aviation training prepared cadets for a variety of water-based operations, 
including anti-submarine operations known as patrol bombing. Before entering combat, 
all naval cadets went through an extensive curriculum that included pre-flight training, 
primary training, intermediate training, and operational training.10 All of these divisions 
came together and produced pilots with the best skill-set to fight the U-Boats in 1942. 
After pre-flight training, where the pilots readied themselves for the physical 
demands of the United States Navy, the pilots moved on to Primary Flight Training.11 
During this two-month event, the cadets learned how to operate an airplane.12 In 
Intermediate Flight Training, the pilots requested in which type of duty they wanted to 
specialize, although in some cases the Navy did not listen to the pilots’ request.13 In the 
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first step in this training, the pilots reviewed what they learned in Primary Flight Training 
but with a heavier aircraft. The heavier aircraft more closely resembled the plane the 
cadet would fly in combat. The pilots then mastered in-plane instruments and subsequent 
navigation. Later, these pilots separated to study the specifics of their individual duties. 
This part of the training program taught pilots the intricacies of patrol bombing, which 
the Army Air Force and the Civil Air Patrol did not address.  
The Naval cadets whom the Navy designated as patrol bombers (VPB) trained for 
ninety hours in six stages: familiarization, instruments, navigation, formation, bombing, 
machine gunnery, and night familiarization.14  After the cadets completed intermediate 
training they received their wings, making them Naval Aviators. These Naval Aviators 
soon moved on to operational training.15 During operational training, the pilots learned 
more extensive information pertaining to their chosen field. The VPB pilots assigned to 
anti-submarine missions, learned particular bombing techniques. Also at this stage, the 
rest of the crew needed to operate with the pilot, such as the navigator, joined with their 
pilot to work as a unit.16 Although the curriculum for pilots gave the cadet necessary 
information and practice, the organization of the divisions needed better communication 
between the commands. 
Indirect communication between the Navy department and the individual air 
stations, where the training and operations occurred, hurt the Navy’s ability to correspond 
with each other. In Pensacola, Florida, the commandant of the Naval district acted as a 
field representative between the Navy department and the Naval Air Stations. This kind 
of communication became, “merely a routine, time-consuming operation, for the 
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commandant rarely had on his staff any officer who was familiar with naval aviation.”17 
Thus, correspondence between the Navy Department and each station went through 
personnel with little knowledge in Naval aviation, before the message reached its 
destination. Another demonstration of the Navy’s ineffectiveness occurred in December 
1940. A subcommittee of the committee on Naval Affairs in the House of 
Representatives visited Naval Aviation training activities and concluded that in its current 
state, training facilities functioned in an unsatisfactory condition. The Naval bases 
operated in thirteen different districts and a man with no experience in Naval aviation 
first interpreted general policies.18 
The Navy trained intensively in patrolling waters in the years before Pearl Harbor. 
Besides the fact that anti-submarine operations entered as a new form of battle for the 
United States Navy, the training, which naval aircrews received in early 1942, occurred 
years before Pearl Harbor. Although these aircrews did not practice attacking U-Boats, 
they became experts at using their equipment and patrolling for large amounts of time, 
needed for anti-submarine operations. Sadly, with the dire situation in the Pacific, the 
amount of naval aviators in the Atlantic coast decreased substantially.  
The United States Navy had the overwhelming responsibility of protecting both 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Navy later stationed most of their forces in the 
Pacific at the beginning of the war.19 With most of the American citizenry and military 
focused on the Pacific theater, Germany’s submersibles enjoyed the relative ease in 
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sinking cargo ships. The United States Navy did have some squadrons in the Atlantic but 
they did not have adequate resources for the immense task in front of them. 
In January 1942 the Naval air force had four squadrons of Catalina flying boats, 
one squadron of Mariners and one of Hudsons. The Navy divided some of these 
squadrons to cover large amounts of water.20 Since the Navy had a lot of experience in 
above water missions, these pilots had an effective presence on the American coast. 
Compared to the other American Air Forces in anti-submarine operations, the Navy, 
when effective, excelled at destroying submersibles; however, in the overall scheme of 
U-Boat attacks, Navy pilots’ skills remained rudimentary for the first few months of the 
war. The Navy credited their aviators with the first two submersible kills of the war and 
the only air power credited with a kill in the first six months of 1942. Specifically, Navy 
was credited with five U-Boat kills in the first six months of 1942. This six-month stretch 
had the least amount of kills in the entire war.21 
Since the Navy needed help in patrolling the Atlantic, two other protagonists, the 
Army Air Force and the Civil Air Patrol joined the battle. Focusing on the failures of all 
of these forces adequately explains the effect training had in Atlantic operations. The 
Army Air Force had trained pilots operating before the attack on Pearl Harbor as well. 
These men knew how to properly navigate and use their equipment essential in 
submersible warfare. Like their naval counterparts, the United States sent these trained 
aviators to Pacific bases to protect American interests.22  
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Due to the unexpected service of AAF in anti-submarine operations, the AAF 
rushed to create a training curriculum. The United States did not establish the Army Air 
Force until 20 June 1941. With Hitler’s military conquests in Europe, the United States 
began to prepare for war. The United States Army Air Corps, later renamed the Army Air 
Force, trained their pilots for war.23 The United States’ Government needed qualified 
pilots incase the war in Europe or Asia spilled over to the Americas. The rush to produce 
aircrews caused the training system to develop while pilots attended training school. 
“Facilities were secured, teachers were hired, and textbooks were written while the first 
classes were being held.”24 This disorganization demonstrates the chaotic situation that 
the Army Air Force dealt with as they attempted to prepare their forces for combat. 
The large increase in aviators did not help strengthen the Air Corps, because the 
training facilities needed more time to prepare for more pilots.. The training facilities 
struggled to properly train their aviators by the program’s earlier deadline.25 The Army 
Air Corps had to choose whether they wanted more pilots training with them, or fewer 
and more prepared graduates. The written work, “Combat Crew and Unit Training in the 
AAF” responds to this difficult decision: “Time is pressing and it is not available for 
turning out individuals who meet the standards of perfection which have been set up in 
the past under a peacetime program.”26 Aircrews rushed through their training in order to 
increase the strength of the Army Air Force. This urgency to commission more and more 
pilots caused the skill of these aviators to worsen, compared to aviators in service years 
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before Pearl Harbor. The United States focused too much on increasing their numbers 
than developing their pilots’ readiness. 
The organization of training in the Army Air Corps also suffered in the years 
leading up to Pearl Harbor, because the command structures separated prior to 1942. The 
Army Air Corps made a few improvements, prior to Pearl Harbor but the organization 
slowly decentralized.27 This division of power further complicated the preparation of 
these pilots. This decentralization of training facilities caused overlap between the 
different groups. In the summer of 1941, the Chief of the Training and Operations 
Division complained to the Chief of the Air Corps that some training actions occurred 
without his knowledge.28 These webs of divisions and groups demonstrate the 
complexities and confusion that took place in AAF training facilities right before the war 
began. 
The sharp increase in personnel and the unexpected U-Boat successes off coastal 
waters created a problem of equipping early training facilities for anti-submarine pilots, 
specifically for AAF pilots. The United States did not have large numbers of ships or 
airplanes to protect the entire Eastern Coast.29 When industries built airplanes and other 
machines, the military sent them to the front lines and not to the training programs. This 
resulted in the aviators’ unfamiliarity with the technology. President Franklin Roosevelt 
wrote to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in May 1942 about the lack of planes for 
aircrews. Roosevelt stated, “Today it is evident that under current arrangements the U.S. 
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is going to have increasingly trained air personnel in excess of combat planes in sight for 
them to use.”30 General Arnold, of the Army Air Force, described that when facilities did 
not have the equipment to train their students, the instructors “were somewhat in the 
position of a man teaching another to swim by showing him a glass of water…”31 During 
this time, training facilities had problems with providing the necessary equipment to give 
their pilots a realistic experience before they left for war.  
Even in early 1943, training areas still had trouble with giving their students 
proper instruction in anti-submarine tactics and techniques. The monthly intelligence 
report for the Army Air Force Antisubmarine Command gave details on this situation. 
“Too often badly needed training is delayed because a lack of equipment which should be 
provided but which cannot be obtained without considerable delay.”32 In one case 
training squadrons had to use sunken ships or floating trailers for bomb training.33 One 
reason for this disorganization deals with the divide between the Navy and Army Air 
Force’s jurisdiction before the war.   
 Before the Second World War pilots did not have experience in basic skills 
essential in the Atlantic. The responsibilities of each branch determined the training pilots 
received. The Navy accepted the burden of protecting and attacking targets in the water 
while the Army focused on engaging targets over land. When the Navy called upon the 
help of the Army Air Force to protect the American coasts, the Army worked outside its 
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element. The Army Air Force did not even have a group specifically assigned for 
attacking submersibles until the United States asked them to help.  
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the unprepared I Bomber Command, started to 
protect the American coast.34 In the first volume of “The Army Air Forces in World War 
II,” the authors write, “It is hardly surprising, then, that Army planes at first flew in 
search of U-Boats armed with demolition bombs instead of depth bombs and manned by 
crews who were ill trained in naval identification or in the techniques of attacking 
submersible targets.”35 The pilots who had the equipment useful in attacking 
submersibles primarily trained in bombing operations instead of in anti-submarine 
warfare.36 These men needed both the proper teaching and the necessary experience to 
operate effectively. It is no surprise that the German submersibles caused so much havoc 
on the American Eastern shoreline. Fortunately AAF pilots received extensive flight 
training that taught them the ins and outs of their aircraft. 
Trainee pilots went through a twelve-week program before they moved on to 
more specific flying classes based on their future operations. The first stage comprised of 
both ground and air instructions. Ground instructions contained training in: tactical 
orientation, military training, indoctrination and familiarization, airplane and engine 
maintenance, signal communications, armament, instruments, link trainer, meteorology, 
dead reckoning navigation, and chemical. Classes lasted 168 hours total. For air 
instructions, the classes consisted of training in: familiarization and transition, individual 
navigation, formation, night flying, and instrument flying. These classes lasted for 48 
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hours total.37 The specialized training after this program did not include patrol bombing 
since the AAF never figured they had to operate in the Atlantic. Compared to the Civil 
Air Patrol pilots, AAF pilots had better training and abilities for anti-submarine warfare. 
  The Civil Air Patrol, like the AAF, did not expect to take such an important role 
in the Battle of the Atlantic. Before these planes flew armed, the Civil Air Patrol pilots 
successfully scared the U-Boats into submerging.38 The moment these pilots started to 
bring weapons on their plane, they patrolled as a submarine attacker. In analyzing Civil 
Air Patrol pilots as submarine attackers, their lack of proper training explained the failure 
of these pilots to sink the U-Boats. Training had little to do with making a submersible 
hide and wait below the water. It is true that when a U-Boat operated below the surface 
they moved so slow that a merchant vessel could outrun their attacker. The submersible 
would still be operational and it could also sink more merchant vessels once the plane 
flew away.  
For roughly a year the Civil Air Patrol protected cargo ships against U-Boats, but 
these pilots did little to destroy the enemy submersibles. The CAP contained thousands of 
workers in this organization and their pilots flew tens of thousand of hours. 
Unfortunately, CAP pilots failed to give the German U-Boats a reason to retreat. One 
source does not even credit the Civil Air Patrol pilots with a single kill.39 Several reasons 
explain this statistic. Lack of equipment, technology and also training could all be 
attributed to the poor performance in destroying submersibles. Samuel Morison writes 
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about how veterans of the First World War serving as CAP pilots in 1942 did not know 
how to use the instruments for flying.40 Inexperience attributed pilots’ struggle in anti-
submarine warfare. Some of these aviators trained in World War I and some had 
hundreds of flying hours under their belt. However, compared to military pilots, CAP 
veterans had little impact in sinking U-Boats. Lack of training and experience hindered 
the effectiveness of CAP pilots.    
Anti-submarine pilots needed hands on experience to find and fix some of the 
problems encountered on patrol missions, which U.S. pilots failed to have at the 
beginning of the war. Early training left out certain methods of anti-submarine tactics, 
because pilots did not discover all the problems of patrolling the Atlantic. As the aircrews 
flew on more and more missions, anti-submarine units improved. In early bombings of 
German U-Boats, Army Air Force pilots killed many marine animals. Aviators at times, 
mixed up the water disruption of a shark with a submersible periscope.41 These mistakes 
can be attributed to a lack of knowledge in what the U-Boats look like, and on the 
aircrews’ lack of patience during coastal patrols.  
Patrolling any body of water for submersibles during World War II consisted of 
both sailors and airmen searching for hundreds of hours without spotting anything useful. 
Morison wrote how the people patrolling the Atlantic grew more and more anxious. They 
spotted a U-Boat in every wave they saw or heard.42 Also, when a German submersible 
escaped an attack, pilots grew impatient and moved on to search different parts of the 
Atlantic. They later found out that they could leave and come back soon after and the U-
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Boat resurfaced.43 From these examples, experience formed an aspect of training. In this 
regard training and subsequent improvement developed over time. The novice level of 
the pilots in operational missions becomes a reason why aviators failed in the first few 
months of the war to protect the United States war machine. Proper experience consisted 
of better techniques, but also more advanced technologies. 
 The difference in technology hurt pilots in anti-submarine missions. In the first 
few months of the war, aviators slowly advanced their proficiency in the new forms of 
detection and attacking technologies. The pilots in anti-submarine operations learned 
these varying technologies to defeat the U-Boats. Also with the incorporation of new 
ways to find and sink U-Boats, every pilot needed to learn how to properly use them.  
Every soldier in ocean operations understood the importance in developing 
technologies to track their enemy. Throughout World War II, militaries installed 
technologies, such as radar, in countless ships and planes. Radar sends a series of 
electronic pulses and a monitor displays an icon based on the signals that bounce back.44 
Radar allowed aircrews to locate nearby U-Boats at any time of day. This became 
extremely important in the aircraft’s ability to spot German submersibles at night, a time 
where U-Boats could hide themselves from detection. The British forces, before 
America’s entry into World War II, first used radar. Their development and training with 
this new technology enabled them to make an impact in both the Battle of Britain and the 
Battle of the Atlantic.  
Pilots needed to train in the proper operation of this equipment to find any 
submersibles. Aviators had trouble with radar in 1942 when planes started to receive this 
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technology. Admiral Doenitz analyzed the use of radar against his own forces. Through 
experience, U-Boat crews realized that staying close to convoys confused Allied aviators 
since they were “unable with their locating gear to tell the difference between their own 
ships and our U-Boats.”45 Aircrews additionally needed to sink a U-Boat once they found 
them. 
Success in anti-submarine warfare required pilots to learn attacking technologies 
to defeat the U-Boat. These weapons in the end destroyed the German submersible. The 
military used depth charges as a common way to sink a submersible. A depth charge is a 
bomb that explodes once it has reached a certain distance underwater. In the first year of 
World War II, America pilots used depth charges as a key method of attacking a 
submersible. After the First World War, the United States thought that their methods of 
destroying a U-Boat in 1918 would still effectively sink a submersible over twenty years 
later.46  
Due to the underdeveloped depth charge and the lack of proper bombsights to 
accurately drop them, the pilots did little to damage the U-Boats for most of 1942. The 
process of dropping a depth charge consisted of using a “seaman’s eye” to accurately 
release their armament.47 Aircrews estimated the location of a submerged U-Boat based 
on the speed of the submersible and the speed of their aircraft. Aviators had trouble doing 
much damage to German submersibles because they could not see the U-Boat they 
attacked and they inaccurately assumed where the submersible operated. Due to the basic 
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nature of the weapon, aircrews needed to use their expertise on the accurate use of depth 
charges. 
Pilots needed training in order to assess the right spot to drop their depth charges. 
Charles Sternhell’s “Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II,” describes the importance 
of training in bombing accuracy. In this book, Sternhell shows how pilots who dropped 
more than ten practice bombs the month before, had sixty-five percent of their attacks 
categorized as good and only fifteen percent as poor. Pilots who dropped less than ten 
practice bombs had fifty-one percent of their attacks classified as good and thirty-six 
percent as poor.48 In 1942 aircrews only started to use these technologies, and many 
others, to sink U-Boats. These pilots had little experienced in the use detection and 
attacking systems like radar and depth charges. Only after months of practice did aviators 
start damaging the German submersible consistently. 
 In conclusion, in the first half of 1942 the situation in the Atlantic reached a new 
low. Even though America worked to improve the effectiveness of coastal patrols once 
they realized their weaknesses, the U-Boat still put America’s shoreline in to chaos up 
until August 1942. The Germans decimated America’s merchant ships with only a few 
ships of their own. In January 1942, the Germans had ninety-one operational U-Boats. Of 
those ninety-one, only a minute amount of submersibles operated on the American 
shoreline. Despite the fact that the Germans built more and more submersibles to use 
against the Allies throughout the war, they never sank as many cargo ships off the 
American coast as they did in the first six months of 1942.49 The U-Boats massacred 
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Allied shipping for the majority of 1942, despite the fact that they had a limited amount 
of operational U-Boats. This is because the Allied forces, specifically aircrews, failed to 
give Admiral Doenitz a good reason to retreat. In 1942, only four percent of American 
airplane attacks did lethal damage to the U-Boat.50 German U-Boats significantly 
damaged American shipping vessels, with little loss on their own side because the United 
States failed to have trained and experienced pilots taking part in anti-submarine warfare.  
 Due to the United States’ obligation to protect both their East and West coasts, the 
United States Navy ordered many trained aviators to the Pacific theater. When Germany 
began Operation Drumbeat, the current Naval forces did not have the strength to protect 
American shipping. Instead of having Naval aircrews, which prepared for patrol 
missions, the United States received improvised aid from the Army Air Force and Civil 
Air Patrol.  
  The Army Air Force unexpectedly joined the Battle of the Atlantic. This force 
had a responsibility to protect the American mainland. With the Naval aircrews separated 
between oceans, the AAF sent pilots to the Atlantic. These men had no previous training 
in patrols over water nor did they receive the necessary training once they operated off 
the American coastline. AAF pilots trained primarily in bombardment, making 
techniques in anti-submarine warfare a secondary importance. Although the training in 
the AAF suffered, their curriculum surpassed that of the civilian forces known as the 
CAP. 
 As the Civil Air Patrol joined the AAF in patrolling the Atlantic, these pilots 
needed more training in flying and navigation. The men chosen to fly failed to meet the 
qualifications that permitted them to join the United States’ armed forces. Thus, when 
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they volunteered to patrol the Atlantic to support the Army and Navy, CAP pilots 
struggled to do any damage to the German submersibles. They needed proper training, in 
the tactics and technologies of anti-submarine warfare. 
 In the first months of the Battle of the Atlantic, the United States’ air forces 
incorrectly implemented the technologies at their disposal. Radar only just reached a 
level where it could be used on an aircraft. Depth charges changed little from the First 
World War and the American pilots needed a bombsight to drop them accurately. All to 
often, aircrews eyeballed the distance of a U-Boat and guessed the right time to drop a 
bomb. Pilots needed experience in attacking submersibles to effectively damage a U-
Boat. 
 Finally, aircrews not only needed experience in detecting and attacking 
technologies but training in anti-submarine warfare in general. The Allies needed crews 
ready for the hours of mind numbing flight where aircrews looked into the vast ocean, for 
any ripples in the water or a surfaced U-Boat. At that time the plane only had seconds to 
make an attack before the submersible submerges. All of these failures provoked the 
United States into trying an alternate method in an effort to improve aircrews. As a result, 
civilian scientists joined the U.S. military to analyze these inadequacies of aircrews. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 INTELLECTUAL ADJUSTMENTS: 
DEVELOPING TACTICS THROUGH SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT1 
 
 We have seen in the previous chapter that American aircrews had 
immense trouble in surprising Admiral Doenitz’s U-Boats. Now we will look at 
who solved the complications that plagued the American forces, both civilian and 
military, that patrolled the coast. The fiasco for Allied forces, known as the 
“Second Happy Time” by the German commanders, did such incredible damage 
to Allied shipping that the United States Government scrambled to find answers. 
How could U-Boats sink this many merchant vessels? Why were aircrews 
ineffective at protecting Allied cargo? What needed to be changed for military 
personnel to have a greater impact on German strategy? Civilian scientists worked 
to explain these problems 
The Navy took the initiative in utilizing civilian analysts in anti-submarine 
warfare. Admiral Ernest King, of the United States Navy, instituted the 
Antisubmarine Warfare Unit to study the German U-Boats and possible defenses.2 
Looking back, these scientists that specialized in operational analysis improved 
the training and experiences of American aircrews. They not only worked on the 
creation of new technologies, but also the proper uses of the technologies, 
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techniques and tactics in anti-submarine operations. Since the production of new 
technologies did little by itself to help in training Allied aviators, I will focus on 
how analysts found more efficient ways of using existing resources. Operational 
analysts implemented a relatively unused art to fix the anti-submarine mess. 
Before this crisis in the Atlantic, adjustments made from scientific research aided 
other situations in the 20th century. 
 In the United States, operations research, specifically in the Navy, existed 
for many years before the Second World War. Some of the few attempts to use 
scientists in military operations occurred in 1906 and from 1917-1918, for air 
combat and anti-submarine operations respectively.3 During the Second World 
War, operational analysis showed off its potential in Great Britain early in World 
War II. The successful assistance by scientists influenced the Allies to take 
advantage of their intellectual citizenry. 
 After German forces started to attack Great Britain on her own land, the 
future of the Allied forces looked bleak. Great Britain raced to find anything to 
give them the advantage in the war. Once France fell in 1940, Germany increased 
its attacks on Great Britain. The new Axis objective, where the German Luftwaffe 
tried to obtain air superiority and compromise the morale of the British people 
evolved into the famous Battle of Britain. Over several months, German airplanes 
bombed major cities in England to make the pending Nazi invasion successful. In 
this battle, Germany had the advantage of numbers, location and time of attack.4 
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As the aggressor in the battle, the Luftwaffe chose where they wanted to bomb, 
putting the British pilots on the defensive. Along these lines, the German pilots 
also decided when to attack, forcing British pilots to remain vigilant at all hours 
of the day. Finally, due to the fact that the Luftwaffe contained more pilots than 
the RAF, German forces could swarm any defending plane.  
During the Battle of Britain, the British military discovered the advantages 
of operational research. British scientists improved techniques in intercepting 
enemy aircraft.5 P.M.S. Blackett, a professor at the University of Manchester, and 
known as the father of operations research, wrote how once he started to help the 
RAF that, “Relatively too much scientific effort has been expended hitherto in the 
production of new devices and too little in the proper use of what we have got.”6 
Great Britain focused too much on developing new weapons that they overlooked 
how they could improve their current weapons. After Blackett’s realization, more 
effort in mastering current resources occurred. In the early years of the Battle of 
the Atlantic, operational researchers in Britain analyzed search methods to 
account for their lack of submersibles spotted.7 American scientists, after visiting 
England, accepted and adopted operational research as a key reason for Britain’s 
                                                
5 M. Kirby and R. Capey, “The Air Defense of Great Britain, 1920-1940: An Operational 
Research Perspective,” The Journal of the Operational Research Society 48, no. 6 (June 1997): 
563. 
6 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The 
Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939- May 1943. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), 
221. 
7 Joseph McCloskey, “British Operation Research in World War II,” Operations Research 35, no. 
3 (May 1987): 456. 
 43 
victory in the Battle of Britain.8 America soon followed Great Britain’s footsteps 
and created a scientific division of their own. 
Throughout the war, America created several groups that used scientists to 
help the war effort. Some of these divisions worked specifically on anti-
submarine warfare. The establishment of the National Defense Research 
Committee (NDRC), in June 1940, organized scientists and researchers to aide in 
the extensive operations conducted by American forces before and after Pearl 
Harbor.9 They defined their scope of activities as 
…concerned with scientific research on and development of new 
instrumentalities or materials of war, or of new materials or 
methods to be used primarily in the manufacture of instruments of 
war; and of the improvement of existing instrumentalities or 
materials of war, or of existing material or methods to be used 
primarily in the manufacture of instruments of war.10  
 
The NDRC took the first steps in improving how servicemen use their weapons in 
the Second World War. 
 This committee worked with both the Navy and the Army Air Force to 
improve their technologies. When it came to Naval operations, the Antisubmarine 
Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG), a division of the NDRC, 
helped to solve any problem associated with German U-Boats. This included the 
development of technologies but also, following Blackett’s pervious epiphany on 
the definition of Operational research, to improve how seaman and aviators used 
these weapons, The operations research division of the Army Air Force, the Sea 
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Search and Attack Development Unit (SADU), operated independently from the 
NDRC unlike ASWORG. They still worked closely with the NDRC and their 
operational research divisions.11 The SADU, created at Langley Field, to study the 
attacking methods and technology in anti-submarine operations.12 In the middle of 
1942, ASWORG sent field analysts to SADU to help in any way.13 This move 
attempted to improve the methods and discoveries of each division. The 
intercommunication between these two divisions no doubt allowed for new 
theories to spread, strengthening their analysis. ASWORG grew into one of the 
primary groups dedicated to implementing scientific methods in the Battle of the 
Atlantic. 
When the German U-Boats began to ravage the American coast from 
January until September 1942, operational analysis showed its full potential in 
anti-submarine operations. In March 1942, the United States established the 
Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group. This group, led by MIT 
physicist Philip Morse, one of the prominent figures in operations research in 
America, worked to help the Navy in their current difficulties. Since ASWORG 
began quite late, compared to the other programs that requested the aid of 
scientists, Morse had a more difficult task in recruiting fellow colleagues. Once 
Morse assembled his team, they immediately started to work together quite 
productively because they, “came from similar background and talked the same 
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language.”14 These civilian scientists first studied the basic concerns of anti-
submarine operations and then they worked to find some solutions.15 
 When it came to anti-submarine warfare, the Antisubmarine Warfare 
Operations Research Group studied how the U-Boats escaped detection. Morse 
writes how, “If the submarine is dangerous because it is hard to find, then the 
process of finding the submarine is an important part of the counteraction.16” Of 
the two forces that spotted a U-Boat, from either a ship or an airplane, ASWORG 
researched the use of the latter as the way to patrol for a surfaced submersible. 
Airplanes covered a larger area in less time than their ship counterparts. Aircraft 
research in anti-submarine operations helped impede U-Boat missions because 
these submersibles actually spent much time at the surface where it operated at a 
higher level.17 German U-Boats moved faster above the water, the fresh air 
recharged their batteries and improved the morale of their personnel. With the 
Germans moving above the surface of the water, the Allies had a greater chance 
of sinking these now vulnerable submersibles. Once ASWORG decided on this 
specific aspect of anti-submarine operations to focus on, they started to ask the 
important questions. “How far away could a surfaced submersible be seen? And 
were they always seen? What percentage of the time were they missed?18” The 
answers to these questions improved the skills of Allied pilots in search and attack 
missions. Answering these questions was not the only obstacle faced by 
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operational researchers. They also needed to prove their worth to their Naval 
superiors.  
  The Navy took some time to accept the idea of using civilians to improve 
military troubles. The Navy did not think that non-military personnel could aid 
them in Naval operations. Philip Morse commented on these strict policies of the 
Navy; “To let nonmilitary persons participate in even minor operational decisions 
was, of course, heretical to many officers, especially those of the Navy…”19 The 
Naval work force sent their personnel, qualified in anti-submarine warfare, in 
operations that did not have them studying the U-Boat war.20 These men worked 
on expanding a Navy that had to fight a two-ocean war.21 This caused a need by 
the Navy to find intelligent men to conduct research. Also, in early 1942, no other 
organization had enough people that knew enough about mathematical methods to 
extract helpful solutions.22 The Navy thought, once they granted scientists the 
chance to help, that they would follow along with the Navy’s work ethic. Morse 
describes this presumption by saying, “I suppose we were expected to file quietly 
in, to studiously digest all the reports, and once in a while to merge to deliver 
some oracular pronouncement…”23  
This feeling of separation between the scientists and the United States 
Navy extended further when Admiral Francis Low, of the Tenth Fleet, refused to 
tell the majority of the civilian scientists where some of their information was 
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derived. ASWORG members voiced their opposition to the “Navy’s refusal to 
make us members of the family.”24 It did not take a lot of time for the military to 
notice the importance of having scientists analyze their field operations, because 
of the growing failures of American forces. Toward the end of the war Admiral 
King stated, “Only by continuing vigorous research and development can this 
country hope to be protected from any potential enemies and maintain the position 
which it now enjoys in possessing the greatest effective naval fighting force in 
history.”25 Even though the military opposed trusting civilians with classified 
information, over time the formulas made by scientific researchers showed 
potential for improvement. 
As a method that these civilian scientists took when they started to observe 
a specific problem in detail they asked, “What course of action will best 
accomplish my objective?”26 Once these analysts started to research a problem in 
detail, they had to consider the same questions before they proceeded.  
a. What objective is to be achieved? b. What different courses of action 
(alternatives) are available? c. What factors (variables) will contribute to 
the success or failure of each possible course of action in achieving the 
objective? d. What yardstick can be used to measure and compare the 
effectiveness of the different alternatives?27 
 
On the question of the objective, scientists had to discover the right 
problem to answer. Depending on the question one asks, the statistical evidence 
can either help or hurt your argument. This focus led to different strategies and 
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how researchers analyzed statistical data. For example, the addition of anti-
aircraft (AA) guns on British merchant vessels to protect themselves from Axis 
aircraft demonstrated how certain questions contain different answers. Once cargo 
crews used AA weapons against the Germans Luftwaffe, operational analysts 
noticed that cargo ships shot down four percent of attacking airplanes. If 
operational scientists wanted to study amount of German aircraft destroyed as 
their objective, then a four percent success rate does not demonstrate that these 
weapons worked. Logically these civilians would conclude to stop fitting cargo 
ships with AA guns. Looking deeper in this situation, researchers realized that 
although only four percent of Axis aircraft crashed in their attacks, ships fitted 
with these weapons protected themselves more so than those without. Twenty five 
percent of cargo ships sank when they did not have any protection while only ten 
percent of cargo ships sank with AA guns. When those researchers viewed the 
safety of Allied vessels as their objective, the fifteen percent difference showed 
that even though crews did not sink many airplanes, AA guns should be fitted on 
more cargo vessels.28 Therefore with this example, the objective achieved and the 
yardstick used to measure its success discovered the most efficient solution to a 
given dilemma. Also the other questions asked by scientists usually helped in the 
decision making of other obstacles.     
 ASWORG effectively analyzed the issues and answered the questions in 
anti-submarine operations by sending field agents to study these obstacles first 
hand. The use of field agents supported the improvement of operations analysis 
because, “…they would work with the users of new weapons, could apply ideas 
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for new tactics in practice, and could recognize new problems to be transmitted to 
the central body for further work.”29 ASWORG sent field agents to frontiers all 
around the United States and abroad. This allowed for analysts to understand the 
finer points of anti-submarine warfare. First-hand accounts also helped scientists 
discover problems specific to each area. Once U-Boats started to sink significant 
numbers of merchant vessels in a certain area, ASWORG sent members there to 
conduct research. Two analysts, Arthur Kip and William Shockley visited the 
Gulf Sea Frontier a month after that area lost 220,000 gross tons of cargo to four 
U-Boats.30 In November, when the U-Boats moved towards the Mid-Atlantic 
Gap, an area in the Northern Atlantic far from any airstrip, ASWORG sent 
researchers Maurice Bell and John Pellam to Newfoundland.31 ASWORG 
researchers, once they gained the needed information, started to notice common 
problems and later gave their input.  
 In 1943, ASWORG reported on the failures of aircrews in anti-submarine 
attacks during 1942, and more specifically, from July until December. They 
realized the extent of the failures made by aircrews patrolling the Atlantic. 
Aircrews, ASWORG discovered, that of all the attacks made in 1942, the Navy 
only characterized four percent of them lethal. In the last six months of 1942, 
patrolling pilots improved their percentage to a feeble five percent. Their report 
below explains the reasons behind why pilots failed to sink a lurking U-Boat. 
From this data, ASWORG scientists worked on finding different solutions.32 
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 ASWORG categorized a majority of the “Reasons for a Failed Attack” on 
pilot errors. In many of the late attacks (A), analysts stressed the necessity for 
pilots to camouflage themselves.33 Also, pilots needed to learn how to properly 
time their attacks so that they caught a U-Boat before it submerged. For bombing 
errors, ASWORG explicitly blamed a majority of the failures on training. The 
March Intelligence Report stated that: 
Unquestionably, the greatest opportunity for improvement of the 
overall results of aircraft attacks on U-Boats lies in this field. And 
the most important single factor affecting the accuracy of bombing is 
training. A number of attacks, for instance, failed because of nothing 
but "buck fever". Bomb bay doors opened too late, firing key switch 
in wrong position, practice bombs dropped instead of live bombs -- 
these are errors resulting from lack of sufficient training and 
experience.34  
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REASONS FOR FAILURE OF ATTACK
(Aircraft Attacks on U-boats, Assessed as Resulting in No Damage)
A. Attack Delivered Too Late
U-boat detected plane at too great a distance . ........ . 8
Too slow in executing attack. 5
Insufficient opportunity to make attack ............. 1
Reason undeterminable ...... ............ .... 4
18
B. Tactical Errors
Bombing error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Insufficient number of bombs dropped. . . . . . . . . . . 3
Fuze setting too deep . . ..................... . 3
Poorly coordinated attack, evidencing insufficient experience . 4
39
C. Mechanical Failures
Bombs failed to release .... ....... . . . . . . . . . . 6
Firing switch failed to opperate . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Intervalometer failure. . ................ . 2
Rack failure ................... .... . 2
Depth Bomb duds .......... . . ............ . 3
Inadequate night illumination . ................. 1
10
D. Miscellaneous
Attacked oil slick. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 3
Disappearing radar contact, attacked swirl ................. . 1
Neither A/S equipment nor personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Insufficient data to permit analysis. . .............. 20
28
E. Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 95*
*In four instances, the bombing error was accompanied by mechanical fail-
ures of sufficient importance that it seemed unwise to attempt to select
a single "cause". This accounts for the total of 95.
A. Attack Delivered Too Late., The impor ance of flying at the best patrol alti-
tudes, maintaining a vigilant lookout, and making proper use of sun, moon and cloud
cover in order to avoid detection by the U-boat, the importance of speed and the
finest coordination on the part of the crew in delivering the attack, all these are
strongly reemphasized by the figures on lateness of attack found under this
heading.
There were seventeen instances where the U-boat had been down so long when the
depth bombs exploded that its location could not be known with any degree of accur-
acy, either in plan or depth. In eight of these attacks it was felt that the sub-
marine detected the plane at a distance such that even the fastest anti-submarine
plane and crew could not have arrived in time to make a successful attack. Slowness
in executing the attack (the fault 'could lie with either the crew or the
plane) accounted for another five cases. In addition, one attack failed when
the depth bombs were hurriedly released on a submarine which was sighted just
below the surface directly beneath the plane. In the remaining four in-
stances, the reasons for the tardy arrival could not be determined from the
data available.
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While these failures occurred, in 1942, operations researchers worked to identify 
possible solutions.  
Operations researchers analyzed the most effective uses of anti-submarine 
technologies. They examined the use of the famous depth charges. They also 
analyzed the most effective use of attacking techniques, like the angle and speed 
of attacks. Finally, they looked at the most efficient use of anti-submarine tactics, 
which included the proper conduct of patrols and proper search patterns. 
Operational analysts cut the time that normal trial and error took in finding overall 
problems in anti-submarine performances. This allowed training procedures and 
subsequently, the aircrews still in school to improve faster 
 The technologies implemented by the Navy and Army Air Forces, grew in 
complexity for aviators to operate. The operation analysts worked to explain how 
aircrews should handle these devices. The constant development of newer 
detecting and attacking technologies helped sink more U-Boats if the pilots 
effectively used them. Scientists, therefore, had the responsibility to make these 
weapons more productive. The weapon aircrews used depth charges to attack a 
submersible in the first couple years of World War II. Of the most common 
mistakes made in anti-submarine operation aircrews incorrectly set the range of 
their depth.  
In the first half of 1942, airplanes dropped depth charges that exploded 
fifty to seventy-five feet below the surface. This setting could be lethal if the 
submersible was at that depth as well. Allied destroyers set their depth charges at 
a range of seventy-five feet. This allowed for the destroyer to reach a safe 
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distance before their bomb exploded. Also, a stalking U-Boat moved below the 
surface making a depth charge at seventy-five feet quite dangerous.35 The deeper 
depth caused problems for aircraft, mainly because once a submersible reached 
this target distance of seventy-five feet underwater the water camouflaged them 
from their attackers. Aircrews’ accuracy in their attack run depended on their 
ability to see the U-Boat. At a level where an aircrew made visual contact with a 
submersible only a twenty-five foot depth charge could explode at a lethal 
distance. Operational researchers concluded that the fifty-foot settings of the 
depth charges caused attacks made between July and December 1942 to have only 
a three percent effect.36 Morse comments on this change of depth charge settings, 
“Within two months it was apparent that this change had increased the number of 
attacks by a factor of about five.”37 
 Even if the Allied aircrews set their depth charges correctly, they still had 
a problem in the aiming of these weapons. Pilots made two errors in submersible 
attacks: line and range errors. Line errors resulted from the steadiness of the plane 
while range errors have to do with the timing of the bomb drop. During an attack 
when the bombs miss their target, The Antisubmarine Command, in charge of 
anti-submarine warfare, discovered three possible reasons. The pilot could have 
dropped their bomb at the wrong time, the plane could have missed flying over 
the target, or both.38 When it came to line errors, pilots just needed to practice 
                                                
35 Morse, 14. 
36 Charles Sternhell and Alan Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, (Washington, 
D.C., 1946) 137. 
37 Morse, 14. 
38 Sternhell and Thorndike, 129. 
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flying in a straight line. For range errors, scientists saw that pilots missed their 
targets in greater distances than in line errors.  
They found out that in missions over water, aircrews incorrectly estimated 
the lead needed to drop a depth charge. The Antisubmarine Command told their 
bombers to drop their charges twenty feet in front of a U-Boat so that once the 
charge reached its set distance underwater the U-Boat moved in to lethal range. 
Bombers flying over water ended up dropping their bombs sixty feet in front of 
their target. Operational researchers looked at this mistake and concluded that 
more training in water based bombing would fix this problem. In the case of range 
errors, practice improved pilots, but also trainers had to specifically tell aircrews 
to compensate their lead because they falsely believed their lead would sink a 
target U-Boat.39 Once these weapons dropped on top of their targets, with a 
proper depth set, these weapons successfully damaged or sank a submersible. 
Pilots just needed to find a submersible on the surface to show off the lethality of 
their improved attack.  
Aircrews also learned the necessary skill of catching a U-Boat on the 
water, a vulnerable position for the German crew. Too often the lookout towers 
on German submersibles saw an incoming airplane and had enough to time hide 
in the safety of the Ocean. Analysts commented on the tardiness of these attacks 
and weighed in on ways to fix the problem. Pilots had to learn was how to hide 
themselves from their prey, as a technique to surprise a U-Boat.  
                                                
39 Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, February 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report, 
February 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/, 22. 
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As explained earlier, a fully submerged submersible had several directions 
to move in order to dodge any weapon. Therefore the pilots also had to spot the 
submersible first. In the fall of 1941, English analysts discovered that at least 
sixty percent of U-Boats had already seen an Allied airplane before the same 
plane spotted the submersible.40 Therefore to surprise their target U-Boat, 
aircrews not only had to stay hidden from possible U-Boats but they also needed 
to be the first one to spot their target.  
In order to catch a U-Boat, pilots had to find a submersible earlier in their 
search. This allowed for pilots to line up with their target and make an effective 
attack run while the submersible sailed through the water unsuspectingly. 
Operational analysts commented on was how aircrews could find a U-Boat faster 
than before. Researchers established a technique in which height proved a 
powerful variable in searching for submersibles. These scientists worked on the 
myth of the proper height an aircraft needed fly in order to spot a submersible. 
Scientists in England found that the higher a plane searched, the more targets an 
aircrew found. The United States did not immediately listen to this advice because 
commanders worried that the higher a plane flew, the lower probability the pilot 
could make a fast and effective attack run. Scientists later worked to disprove this 
assumption.41  
Aircrews also improved a technique to make sure the Germans did not 
spot their plane before they had enough time to attack. Pilots had to use their 
                                                
40 Professor C.H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U-Boat 
(London: Unwin Brothers Limited, 1973), 151. 
41 Waddington, 162. 
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surroundings for camouflage.42 In one example, operations analysts wrote how 
pilots needed to fly in and out of the clouds around them to get a better jump on a 
submersible.43 Analysts also discovered that when a plane flew behind the sun, 
enemy units spotted much more Allied aircraft because of the contrast in color.44 
On the contrary, during night attacks, pilots would dive on a submersible with the 
help of the moonlight.45 Surprise attacks allow for aircrews to properly aim their 
weapons on a submersible. Once a U-Boat fully submerged itself, Allied pilots 
could only guess to its location. Aircrews only dropped their weapons accurately 
when they compensated their drop where they expected a U-Boat to move 
through, at the time of detonation. Therefore the submergence of a target 
submersible, also known as ‘blind time’ affected the allowance pilots gave on 
their drop. Operational researchers commented how, “The effect of a long blind 
time will be especially serious in aircraft attacks since there is no information as 
to the target’s course and speed except visual estimation…”46 The use of attacking 
techniques increased the chance of finding a surfaced U-Boat. Catching a 
submersible on the surface thus made aircrews incredibly more deadly.  
 In some cases pilots failed in anti-submarine operations because their 
strategies ineffectively searched the Atlantic. Pilots used to search for U-Boats in 
short distances and would leave early after an unsuccessful attack. Civilian 
scientists worked to find the most statistically efficient pattern for their airplanes. 
                                                
42 Sternhell and Thorndike, 128. 
43 Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, March 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report, March 
1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/, 19. 
44Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, January 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report, January 
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45 Office of Air Force History, Army Air Forces in World War II Vol 1, 532. 
46 Sternhell and Thorndike, 128. 
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This included the amount of area a given plane could search, and how many 
aircraft a given operation needed to find a surfaced U-Boat.47  
 A proper search pattern allowed for more sightings and attacks on U-
Boats. However, aircrews needed to conduct searches that could find a 
submersible that escaped below the water. Too often pilots would acknowledge 
that their attack failed and then they would search the area briefly before flying 
away. In December 1942 operations analysts wrote about a pilot who dove on a 
U-Boat too late and in response, flew in a wide circle in cloud cover until the 
submersible resurfaced.48 The success of this sortie credited the aircrews’ tactic, 
making this method of attack beneficial for many different commands. This 
improvement helped to make new aircrews more efficient. With the 
implementation of baiting tactics, pilots had multiple chances to damage their 
target submersible.  
 Operations researchers also confirmed ideas held by many experienced 
pilots. Aviators had a feeling that the closer towards shore a plane searched, the 
less likely the chance that they would find a submersible. This is because a U-
Boat remained submerged for as long as they could once they operated close to 
any shoreline.49 This made conducting searches further from base enticing and 
more common. 
 Training made aircrews effective in the Atlantic. Operations researchers 
gave the crucial advice essential for these new pilots. This gave training programs 
                                                
47 Morse, 13. 
48 Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, December 1942: Monthly Intelligence Report, 
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49 Sternhell and Thorndike, 140. 
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more information to teach their students, finally making them the deadly force the 
military expected from them. Once ASWORG members discovered a problem 
made by most aircrews, they recommended how to fix it. Training programs then 
implemented this correction, making new aviators that much better. William 
Shockley, a scientist in ASWORG noticed how aircrews only had, on average, 
one opportunity to sink a submersible in their “active life”.50 The active life of an 
aircrew is the amount of time a crew is together before the military sent them to 
other duties, killed or wounded.  
Due to the lack of time for each aircrew to improve from their own 
experiences, the military need to report any discovery in anti-submarine warfare 
to have these techniques and tactics implemented in training. Experience is a great 
way to improve any military force. Sadly, because of the short active life of 
aircrews, the Army Air Force and the Navy could only benefit as a whole from 
the realizations made by pilots instead of the individual aircrews. This is one of 
the reasons why civilian scientists impacted anti-submarine training and the skill 
of operational aircrews. In the Battle of the Atlantic, tactics and techniques 
constantly changed and adapted to give one side a greater advantage. Operations 
researchers had to catch the U-Boat as the German Navy started to implement 
different strategies and subsequently develop new techniques for their pilots.51 
New aviators and those in the field needed to regularly learn new tactics. Training 
programs started to improve as the war continued. “…it is now possible for the 
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entire crew of a submersible to rehearse approaches and torpedo attacks against 
enemy task forces in trainers on dry land…”52 
In conclusion, after the insurmountable amount of merchant vessels lost in 
the first several months after Pearl Harbor, the United States Navy needed 
answers. Although the Navy did not want to work closely with civilian scientists, 
they realized that these researchers knew how to figure out the solutions necessary 
to turn the tides in the Battle of the Atlantic. ASWORG, after its creation, 
analyzed technologies, techniques, and tactics of aircrews. American scientists not 
only created newer technologies to be fitted on patrol craft but found the proper 
way to use existing ones. The settings of the old depth charge improved. When it 
came to techniques, the use of their natural surroundings helped to make their 
attacks lethal. The tactics of a useful search pattern then allowed for the Allies to 
spot a U-Boat. As scientists realized each of these new developments, new 
aircrews benefitted. An aircrew only had one opportunity to sink a U-Boat and 
because of this, the military made sure new trainees knew all the tricks on their 
missions.  
                                                
52 Ernest J. King, 718. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 AN OVERWHELMING IMPROVEMENT: 
ALLIED REFORM AND AXIS DEFEAT1 
After the middle of 1942, America’s effectiveness in the Battle of the Atlantic 
improved. No longer could German U-Boats scout the United States coastline without 
worrying about their safety. Even in missions in the North Atlantic, German submersibles 
preferred to attack a convoy once they moved outside the range of any patrol plane. 
Improvements in the pilots and the organization command helped America changed the 
tides of the Battle of the Atlantic. After extensive analysis, aircrews perfected the tactics 
and techniques of anti-submarine operations, making their attacks more numerous and 
lethal.  
The United States used the advice of the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations 
Research Group to develop the detecting and attacking aspects of anti-submarine 
operations. The American military also reformed their command structure to adequately 
train aircrews for patrolling missions. In this progression, Naval and Army Air Force 
aviators corrected many of the problems that plagued American aircrews in early 1942. 
The Army Air Force realized the need to graduate pilots who had more education. 
This educational awakening contained both an improvement in the selection of cadets and 
a correction to the curriculum for pilots. After these changes, the Army Air Force 
                                                
1 In this chapter I used several appendices from authors such as Samuel Morison and S.W. Roskill to show 
the changes in the Battle of the Atlantic over time. I also studied intelligence reports since they graphed 
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improve skill of aircrews. Unfortunately since the Army Air Forces did not establish the AAFAC until late 
1942, I do not have many statistics of U-Boats attacked and sank during the majority of 1942. Finally, I 
looked at sources that outlined new commands and divisions created in the Battle of the Atlantic that 
emphasized training. Groups with a direct objective of training shows a focus on pilot improvement.  
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accepted men who showed promise in the strains of flying. Also these pilots attended 
classes that incorporated training in anti-submarine operations.  
Reorganization of the commands in charge of training helped to coordinate the 
methodology and structure of schooling cadets. This reform coupled with the educational 
corrections established an air force ready to fight the German submersibles. Both the 
Army and Navy fixed their problems and operated in the Atlantic with great 
accomplishment. 
These solutions made American forces in the Atlantic able to pressure the German 
submersibles and even make them retreat to safer waters. The aircrews’ abilities to attack 
a U-Boat and, more importantly, sink the same submersible increased immensely since 
their early failures in 1942. These successes forced the German commanders to operate in 
areas away from high merchant traffic or of any military importance. By August 1943 the 
scene in the Atlantic saw a complete reversal. German U-Boats no longer influenced 
Allied operations.  
The Army restructured their commands with the creation of the Army Air Force 
Antisubmarine Command (AAFAC). Before this division, the I Bomber Command 
picked up the slack for the Navy. Sadly, this command primarily operated in bombing 
missions and not in anti-submarine patrol. With the AAFAC, pilots trained specifically in 
the skills necessary for anti-submarine warfare. The Navy followed suit and created an 
anti-submarine warfare unit. 
After the German U-Boats moved to the North Atlantic in late 1942 and 
subsequently sank tons of cargo vessels away from the air umbrella that previously 
protected them, the United States Navy established a command devoted to patrolling the 
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Atlantic. The Tenth Fleet organized the operation and training of patrol units, since the 
Navy increased the amount of pilots ready for combat. A larger pool of pilots allowed for 
the Navy and AAF to greatly improve on their current cadets. This included a more 
rigorous entry examination and more developed training. 
The United States’ improvements to the organization of training and the specific 
curriculum for pilots coincided with their growing success in the Atlantic. Now pilots and 
cadets received accurate and coordinated training that shaped them into a deadly unit. 
Since both operating pilots and ASWORG scientists at this point identified impressive 
strategies in response to America’s earlier inexperience in anti-submarine warfare. First 
the Army Air Force, who conducted a significant amount of patrolling missions, required 
the selection of capable pilots. 
In 1942 the Army Air Force changed the way that they chose possible cadets for 
training. The Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination improved the format of the 
questions. From 1942-1943 the AAF created questions to observe whether or not the 
student could learn vocabulary and scenarios expected of a pilot. For example, instead of 
asking a student to find the fourth power of one plus the square root of negative one, the 
test asks the student to determine how long it would take for two planes of different 
speeds to reach a certain distance from one another.2 Due to this new objective the AAF 
cancelled the need for any education experience.3 From this selection overhaul, Army Air 
Force cadets had relevant knowledge for flying missions. 
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3 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, 
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After the Army Air Force found a talented pool of cadets, these new pilots needed 
more accurate training in anti-submarine warfare. When the AAF realized that they had 
to patrol the U.S. coast for U-Boats, they implemented a new training program devoted to 
prepare pilots with this new operation. Pilots trained with the Operational Training Unit 
for four weeks. This course consisted of “B-24 transition, bombing and gunnery, 
navigation and practice patrol.”4 This class analogous with Naval training qualified 
aircrews for anti-submarine operations. After completing the course, pilots understood 
many of the technologies and techniques of ASW. 
 The Army also incorporated an intensive bombing program in 1943. The 
Antisubmarine Command Training Directive coordinated the tasks during this program as 
a way to improve the bombing accuracy of anti-submarine pilots. Throughout the training 
regiment, pilots practice flying in the clouds while using their radar to position 
themselves for an attack. The pilots then move on to Naval exercises where they sharpen 
their attacks on a submerging submersible. Colonel Halverson of the 26th Air Wing 
commented on this form of training: “This kind of training boosts combat crew morale 
tremendously. Working first with a simulated U-Boat, and finally with an actual 
submarine, gives each crew member confidence and the feeling that any enemy 
submarine he meets will never meet another 26th AWIG plane!”5 
 Throughout the training operations, the results are recorded in an effort to allow the 
pilots to see their attacks and for the operations researchers to analyze them. During the 
pilots’ practice drops on a target, a tail gunner plots where the bombs landed and also 
cameras in the plane take pictures of the drop. These pictures helped the pilot see where 
                                                
4 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, The Antisubmarine Command. Army Air 
Force Historical Studies 107, (April 1945), 219. 
5 Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, February 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report, 26. 
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his charges ended up. While these exercises occur, an adjoining plane filmed the attack 
and the pilot saw the results of the exercise. The Plans and Training Section later received 
the film for analysis.6  
Although all of these corrections in the teaching of new pilots prepared cadets for 
the complexities of anti-submarine operations, the Army Air Force and the Navy had to 
also organize their efforts against the U-Boats by creating a command with the sole 
responsibility of anti-submarine warfare. Throughout 1942, a large variety of forces 
conducted anti-submarine patrols. Of the forces involved, none had the strength to take 
control of anti-submarine operations. The Army Air Force started to restructure in the fall 
of 1942 for an anti-submarine command.  
With the I Bomber Command weakened because it had to divide its strength 
between operating as a bombardment unit and as a patrolling unit, the Army air Force 
decided to commission a command for protecting American waters from the German 
submersibles. On 15 October, 1942 the Army Air Forces centralized their anti-submarine 
patrols and created the Army Air Force Antisubmarine Command (AAFAC). This 
command followed the British Coastal Command organization, which allowed for a unit 
to train and prepare solely for these specific operations. Also this command had more 
freedom to take part in anti-submarine warfare.7 Most of the units and equipment of the 
AAFAC came from the I Bomber Command due to their previous experience.8 The 
AAFAC only enjoyed control in anti-submarine operations for a limited time. Less than a 
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year later, the Navy created its own unit for anti-submarine warfare. This change came 
about after the German U-Boat victories in the North Atlantic. 
In 1943 the United States Navy worked to fix any and all problems associated 
with their organization of anti-submarine operations, including training. After the U-
Boats in the North Atlantic started to sink absurd amount of merchant vessels President 
Roosevelt explained a need for victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. 9 Soon after this 
statement, the Navy made the final organizational change in regard to the anti-submarine 
operations. The Navy created this fleet as a specific command devoted to anti-submarine 
operations, the Tenth Fleet. However, the Army Air Force Anti-submarine Command still 
operated against the German U-Boats. The Tenth Fleet reintroduced an organizational 
problem that existed for years. With the Army in charge of the land-based planes and the 
Navy in charge of the implementation of these planes, how could the United States unify 
a command devoted to anti-submarine warfare? One side needed to control anti-
submarine training and operations to effectively patrol the Atlantic. 
The Navy pushed for the Tenth Fleet to have sole jurisdiction in anti-submarine 
operations and moved to discontinue the aid of other units. In one of the first moves made 
by the Tenth Fleet, the Navy worked to discontinue the Army’s power in the Atlantic. 
Specifically, Rear Admiral Low said: 
The fact that Army aircraft assigned to antisubmarine operations reported 
only to the operational control of Sea Frontier Commander, which resulted 
in the anomalous situation of CominCh being unable to give orders to 
echelons who were under his juniors because of the Army construction 
(with which the Navy did not agree) that such a command relationship 
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precluded issue of orders to Army A/S aircraft by anyone except the Sea 
Frontier Commanders and the Army Commanders.10  
 
Little by little the Navy substituted their pilots with the current Army Air Force pilots 
conducting anti-submarine operations until the Navy had complete control of the Battle 
of the Atlantic. Finally, in the summer of 1943, the Army Air Force bowed out of the 
argument and agreed to give the Navy, who historically had responsibility in operations 
over water, complete control of anti-submarine operations.  
At a conference in June 1943, General Arnold agreed to withdraw Army Air 
Force control in anti-submarine operations once the Navy had the strength to take over. 
This, along with a trade of anti-submarine fitted aircraft for unmodified B-24s ended the 
extensive fight over control in anti-submarine operations.11 Finally, in August 1943 the 
Army Air Forces designated the AAFAC back to the I Bomber Command, inactivating 
their units that patrolled for submersibles.12 This made the Tenth Fleet the unit in charge 
of finishing the Battle of the Atlantic. Now the United States had a command with a 
centralized training program, cadets received a more unified curriculum.  
The Tenth Fleet had no direct attachment with the planes and ships in anti-
submarine operations. Instead, the fleet operated through the individual Sea Frontiers and 
Fleet Commands.13 The Commander in Charge of the Navy described the directive for 
the Tenth Fleet.  
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(a) Destruction of enemy submarines. 
(b) Protection of Allied shipping in the Eastern, Gulf and Caribbean Sea 
Frontiers. 
(c) Support of other Anti-submarine Forces of our own and of the Allied 
Nations operating in the Atlantic Areas. 
(d) Exercise of control of convoys and shipping that are U.S. 
responsibilities. 
(e) Correlation of U.S. anti-submarine training and material 
development.14 
 
Therefore, the Tenth Fleet became responsible for all operations off the coast of the 
United States and further into the Atlantic Ocean. Even though the Commander in Charge 
did not list of directives above by importance, the succinct explanation of (a) represents a 
significant mission in the Atlantic.   
 The Navy organized the Tenth Fleet into five divisions. The first, Operations 
Division under Captain William Sample, handled the forces assigned to anti-submarine 
work and the combat intelligence team that plotted U-Boat locations. The Navy also had 
the Convoy and Routing Division under Rear Admiral Metcalf that developed the convoy 
system used. The Tenth Fleet also contained a Civilian Scientific Council and the Air 
Anti-submarine Development Unit Atlantic Fleet. Finally, the Tenth Fleet organized the 
Anti-submarine Measures Division.15 
The Anti-submarine Measures Division under Captain Haines, and later Captain 
Fitz, correlated “anti-submarine research, materiel development, and training.” In July 
1943 the Tenth Fleet absorbed ASWORG making those civilian scientists working with 
Phillip Morse report directly to this new group.16 The Tenth Fleet put ASWORG under 
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the leadership of Captain Haines in this division.17 Similar to the establishment of the 
Tenth Fleet that consolidated multiple entities into a single body, the Anti-submarine 
Measures Division integrated ASWORG to better coordinate anti-submarine training. 
To specifically describe the goals of the Anti-submarine Measures Division, the 
Commander in Charge of the Navy stated that the division needed to take steps so that:  
(a) each ship and plane is proficient in the basic technique of normal 
operations both as to personnel and material. 
(b) training in the use of sound and special equipment is intensive and 
sustained. 
(c) all units (surface and air) are subjected to regular refresher courses at 
training centers appropriately organized, staffed and equipped. 
(d) training is conducted through the medium of a standardised 
instructions approved by this Headquarters.18  
  
Along with the list of intentions of the Tenth Fleet, the Navy also circulated ways 
to improve an attack on a U-Boat. In June of 1943 the “U.S. Fleet Anti-submarine 
Bulletin” summarized different aspects of the anti-submarine war including doctrine and 
training. This bulletin communicated new developments in anti-submarine operations and 
training more often than the tactical publications.19 Thus, officers constantly learned new 
practices to follow in a battle with regularly changing strategies. 
Around the same time that the Navy commissioned the Tenth Fleet, The Navy 
also established the Aircraft Antisubmarine Development Detachment. This detachment 
allowed for a more direct connection between the pilots and the civilian scientists. From 
this correspondence, the Navy discovered the proper ways of conducting anti-submarine 
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operations. This included finding the best uses of anti-submarine technologies, and 
developing improved communications for pilots in anti-submarine warfare. This 
command tested different problems in patrolling missions. Students applied the new 
techniques of fighting in this detachment.20 From this detachment, the Navy learned new 
tactics that they could forward to the training divisions and operational pilots.   
 The evolution of the divisions, which managed the aircrews in anti-submarine 
warfare and their training, built and prepared a competent unit to fight the German 
submersibles.  With a greater understanding into the organization of anti-submarine 
commands and the specific training regiment pilots received, the role of training 
demonstrated itself as a valid explanation to the growing success of aircrews in the 
Atlantic theater. These improvements in the organization of training combined with the 
advice from operations researchers increased the lethality of anti-submarine aircrews. 
The developments of the aircrews’ abilities played a part in the statistical achievements 
displayed towards the end of the Battle of the Atlantic. 
 All the improvements in the curriculum and organization, strengthened the 
graduating aircrews of the Navy and Army Air Force. Not only did the Allies’ merchant 
shipping lanes operate without the slightest fear of damage, but also the Allies sank the 
German U-Boats so regularly that the submersibles patrolled waters unimportant to the 
war effort. The Allied aircrews increased the attacks made on a U-Boat, the amount of U-
Boats sunk and their lethality. From the alarmingly low statistics on aircrew proficiency 
in the months after Pearl Harbor, the Allies boosted their prowess in anti-submarine 
warfare. 
                                                
20 Samuel Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 10, The Atlantic Battle 
Won: May 1943- May 1945, 50-51. 
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  An increase in the amount of U-Boats attacked demonstrated an improvement in 
many different factors. Advancements in technology allowed for aircrews to spot a U-
Boat, and the proper implementation of aircrews to bases in the North Atlantic placed 
aviators closer to the U-Boat’s new areas of operations, but also more developed training 
helped pilots to properly attack a submersible. Specifically, ASWORG analyzed the best 
pattern for pilots to spot any patrolling submersible. Also the pilots learned how to fulfill 
their plane’s capabilities. The aircrews also improved on their abilities to spot a 
submersible.  
 The figure below shows the increase in U-Boats attacked from January until 
August 1943.21 The graph indicates that Allied aircrews improved on their abilities to 
attack a patrolling submersible. Undoubtedly, aircrew performance, from training, 
evoked this change in some respect.  
                                                
21 Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, August 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report, August 1943, 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/, 21 
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  The graph demonstrates the boost in U-Boats attacks in 1943. Allied attacks 
skyrocketed after February 1943. After May, we see a drop in the number of attacks 
made, but we also see that the number of U-Boats at sea has decreased as well. On 
average, from March until May 1943 Admiral Doenitz ordered 115 U-Boats to operate in 
the Atlantic. After this time the amount of U-Boats in the Atlantic continues to drop until 
late 1944. Specifically, from June to August 1943 only seventy-six U-Boats patrolled the 
Atlantic on average.22 Unfortunately, examples like weather condition, and the slow 
increase of Allied long-range aircraft, share credit for the increase in attacks on U-Boats.  
                                                
22 Porten 248. 
CHART Vii - Summary of U/B Warfare
To avoid misunderstanding it is emphasized that the foregoing discussion does not
concern all attacks on U-bo s, but nly those in which'at least some damage was deemed
to have been suffered by the Urboat. The purpose is to point out that where the circum-
stances are such as to enable the attacking Allied forces to get close enough, quickly
enough, to do at least some damage to the submarine, their skill in doing a lethal job
appears to be steadily improving. In August, the last month under discussion, 75% of the
damaging attacks against Axis submarines were lethal or probably lethal.
Chart VII portrays in detail the current decline in U-boat operations as well as pre-
vious variations in terms of four indices of activity, namely, the number of U-boats at
sea, U-boats attacked, U-boats sunk and probably sunk, and merchant vessels sunk by U-boats.
This chart is based upon data for the German-Italian submarine operations only and indic-
ates that the enemy submarine effort has ,eached an all time low.
By expressing the four indices of activity in terms of a 30-day average or 30-day
cumulation, minor fluctuations are eliminated and significant trends become apparent.
Chart VII h s been plotted in this manner. Each value, therefore, is an av rage or cumu-
lation for the preceding 30 days.
The most mportant trend is the decline in all h indices of activity which began in
mid-July and extended to mid-September. During this time, the daily number of U-boats 'at
sea declined at nearly a uniform rate from 110 at the beginning of this period to 45 in
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 Statistics on the amount of U-Boats sunk also show an improvement of aircrews 
in anti-submarine warfare. As I stated in the beginning of this study, the number of U-
Boats lost sheds light on the competence of Allied aircrews. German submersibles, for 
the most part, submerged once they spotted an airplane. Any convoy of merchant vessels 
could escape without harm once a U-Boat operated underwater. Only with the destruction 
of his U-Boat force, could the Allied claim total victory in the Atlantic. 
 U.S. forces had trouble in sinking U-Boats in the first few months of the war. 
Until August 1942, the German U-Boats operated around American waters with little 
danger from aircraft. In August, American planes sunk, or helped to sink four U-Boats. 
Compared to the months before, only March and July enjoyed the successes of multiple 
U-Boat kills in a single month.23 After this month, the U-Boats retreated to operate in the 
North Atlantic, away from Allied aircraft. When U.S. planes started to move to the North 
Atlantic, the amount of U-Boats killed grew tremendously. The above graph shows this 
increase in U-Boats sunk during 1943. The improvements from early 1942, demonstrate 
the progression of Allied aircrews in the Atlantic. Not only did aircraft make more 
attacks on U-Boats but also they sunk more in the process. 
  The lethality of aircraft in the Battle of the Atlantic validated the argument of 
training and better-prepared aircrews as an aspect in America’s success against the 
German submersibles. The accomplishment of Allied aircrews in properly coordinated 
attacks represents the improvements of training in the Atlantic.  
 When the United States entered the Second World War, American pilots struggled 
in not only finding a submersible, but also in executing an attack on a U-Boat that 
                                                
23 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1: The Battle of the Atlantic, 
415. 
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damages it. The Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group studied the attacked 
by American pilots and realized the horrible inaccuracies of the pilots. These operations 
researchers determined that in 1942 that aircraft lethally damaged a U-Boat four percent 
of the time. After analysis on those failures and the organizational reform of the Navy 
and Army Air Forces did the lethality of pilots rise. The graph below shows the 
effectiveness of air attacks on U-Boats in 1943.24 The axis on the left represents the 
amount of merchant vessels sunk for every U-Boat sunk. The axis on the right represents 
the amount of U-Boats sunk per attack made by the Allies. 
 
 Compared to the four percent chance of a U-Boat sinking after an attack, the 
Allies increased their efficiency in 1943. Despite poor weather and a change of temporary 
                                                
24 Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, August 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report, August 1943, 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/, 23 
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CHART VIII - Xofficiency of Attacks BY U-Boats
and AGAINST U-Boats
shown in the chart, it is understandable that some decline should take place after the
enemy resorted to various countermeasures to reduce the number of sightings and the time
available for lethal attack. Moreover countermeasures developed by the enemy in the Bay
tend to be u elsewhere. They include greater cautiousnoss of U-boat command rs in
diving more quickly, aided probably by a type of relatively short range anti aircraft
radar affording a few seconds more warning of a plane's approach than would be possible
by visual means. Appropriate means of coping with this situation are in process of devel-
opment but temporarily some decline in the efficiency of aircraft attacks from an over-all
point of view may be experienced, notwithstanding improved skill in placing the depth
bombs or charges when attacking forces are close enough for timely action. A similar de-
cline occurred in late June as a result of increased AA tactics by submarines. After a
short period, however, the AA tacties were successfully met and the rate of efficiency
rose higher than ever as attacks on surfaced U-boats proved to be the most costly to the
enemy.
On the other hand, the fight-back U-boat has taken a substantial toll in duels with
Allied aircraft. Not counting a number of instances where antisubmarine planes have been
missing after reporting an impending attack upon a U-boat, this Headquarters has records
of 17 aircraft destroyed and 65 damaged by U-boat AA fire thus far in 19413.
August was the worst month in this respect. 25 aircraft attacks were made in the
face of U-boat AA fire, resulting in the known destruction of 6 submarines, although 9
aircraft were destroyed and 9 damaged in connection with these engagements. Such figures
present ample evidence of the determination and valor of the antisubmarine aircraft crews
in the fulfillment of their duty regardless of peril to themselves.
1
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change in tactics by the German commanders, pilots never reached the low levels of 
accuracy of 1942. The graph shows the lethality of the Allies reaching as high as twenty-
nine percent. ASWORG analysts wrote that the percentage increase of U-Boats sunk per 
attack, demonstrated the success of training and experience in anti-submarine warfare.25   
 In 1943, aircrew abilities reached a high level in the Atlantic. No longer did 
German U-Boats patrol merchant lanes as they did a year prior. With an increase in the 
number of pilots, the United States Navy reestablished themselves as the only force in the 
Atlantic. The Tenth Fleet unified anti-submarine training and operations and the Army 
Air Force designated their anti-submarine forces back to their original roles as bombers. 
Also, after months of analysis and experience in anti-submarine warfare, aircrews knew 
the best tactics and techniques to fight the U-Boat. All of these factors came together to 
make a strong Navy and Army Air Force.  
In 1942, American aircrews reported an inadequate four percent in attacks the 
Navy assessed as lethal. In 1943 this number rose exponentially. Allied aircraft pushed 
the German U-Boats from the British coast, the American coast and even in the mid-
Atlantic gap, out of range from most aircraft. Finally the Battle in the Atlantic ceased to 
be relevant. Well-trained American aircrews defeated the U-Boat menace of 1942, 
allowing for the Allies to focus on advancing instead of defending. Even though 
American troops still had a lot of fighting left before the Axis surrender, the successes in 
the Atlantic roughly marked an end of the beginning in the Second World War.       
                                                
25Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, August 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report, August 1943, 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/, 23. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In the Battle of the Atlantic, training showcased its importance in turning the tides 
against the German submersibles. Properly trained aircrews in anti-submarine warfare 
reinforced the urgency to not only develop modern technology, but also to prepare 
aviators and seamen to fight the U-Boats. Accurate training combined with advances of 
anti-submarine weapons, proper implementation of resources and many other reasons, as 
an explanation for the American victory in the Atlantic.  
 This Independent Study looked at the human element in the Battle of the Atlantic. 
Warfare in the twentieth century contained more advanced machinery than in any 
previous conflict. Countries relied heavily on technological developments to demonstrate 
their strength. However, the soldiers, like the technology, had to improve. In a sense, 
learning the technologies became more pivotal than its creation. Additionally, parallel to 
technological upgrades, more sophisticated tactics emerged, especially in the Atlantic. 
Pilots needed to master difficult attacking techniques to successfully destroy a U-Boat.  
 This thesis examined the role of training for American pilots in the Battle of the 
Atlantic. When other authors described pilot training in the Battle of the Atlantic they 
wrote about other aspects of the battle as well. Other prominent authors described 
technological upgrades, intelligence superiority, and anti-submarine strategies as reasons 
for the Allied victory in the Atlantic. All of the arguments above rightfully explained 
causes for the destruction of the U-Boat, however in this study I focused only on one 
aspect, in order to get a more detailed look at the battle, training. This paper spotlighted 
the training aspect of the Battle of the Atlantic including the training regiment of 
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American aircrews. This allowed for a more detailed look at one of the many reasons 
why America’s effectiveness in the Second World War improved over time. 
 In the Battle of the Atlantic, exceedingly difficult operations demonstrated the 
need for trained aircrews. Atlantic patrols involved hours of looking and waiting in the 
hopes of catching a stalking U-Boat. When aircrews spotted a submersible they had only 
seconds to move into position and attack before the U-Boat fled. Thus aircrews needed 
training to improve their attacks on submersibles. 
 Since American aircrews lacked proper training in anti-submarine warfare, 
German U-Boats enjoyed relative ease in obtaining their objective of economic 
disruption. The German objective, equivalent to the First World War, focused on 
destruction of Allied merchant cargo to cut off valuable resources to the Allies. The 
Allies, on the other hand, concentrated on protecting their ships and sinking the German 
submersibles to enable a well-supplied invasion of Europe. When America joined the 
battle, the German U-Boats sank tons of merchant cargo. Training, coupled with other 
reasons caused America’s inability to fight against the German onslaught.  
 The defending aircrews never trained in or had experience in the complexities 
anti-submarine warfare. Since most of the Naval aviators trained in patrolling the Atlantic 
Ocean left for the Pacific theater, the United States had to elicit help from forces unready 
for this kind of warfare. The Army Air Force had jurisdiction over the American 
continent and therefore they never expected to operate in anti-submarine missions. The 
Civil Air Patrol joined the Army Air Force and they also struggled in patrol missions 
because CAP pilots lacked the training of anti-submarine operations. 
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 In some cases, even the most accurate training at the time left operating aircrews 
unprepared because America never experienced anti-submarine warfare. Once pilots in 
the field learned effective techniques after trial and error, classes taught cadets new 
breakthroughs. While pilots slowly discovered more effective ways of fighting, the 
German U-Boats succeeded in destroying merchant vessels. 
 Next, due to the unexpectedly early entrance in the Second World War, the 
United States military did not organize their commands efficiently. The Army Air Forces 
decentralized their command structure making it more difficult for officers to coordinate 
pilot training. The Navy, like the Army Air Force, also needed to reform its structure. 
Indirect communication that passed through a commandant who had little knowledge in 
aviation hampered the Navy’s ability to operate at a high level. 
 The United States reluctantly took advantage of the untapped pool of intellectuals 
as a way to improve their understanding of anti-submarine warfare and subsequently their 
training. The Navy wanted to know the reasons why American pilots failed to sink the 
German U-Boats. Even though the Navy unenthusiastically shared their information with 
civilian scientists, these analysts proved their worth in finding solutions to pilot errors. 
 Operations researchers recognized the importance of properly using the resources 
currently available. These scientists analyzed the mistakes made by aircrews and 
instituted more improved techniques. In one example, scientists examined how to 
properly use the technologies at their disposal, which cadets and operational aircrews 
soon learned. With the example of depth charges, setting them to a shorter distance 
allowed for an increase of damage to a target U-Boat. Along with improvements of 
 77 
technology, civilian analysts fixed how pilots searched and attacked German 
submersibles. 
 Improvements in the tactics and techniques of aircrews in anti-submarine 
operations enhanced the effectiveness of American forces. Due to the research of 
scientific groups like the Antisubmarine Operations Research Group, cadets trained in 
techniques like camouflage to surprise a U-Boat. They also learned more specific search 
patterns to increase their chances of finding a patrolling submersible. 
 In 1943, with the help of more adequate training, Allied pilots attacked more U-
Boats, sank more U-Boats and increased the lethal percentage of their attacks. American 
aviators conducted patrol missions at a higher proficiency in 1943 than in 1942 because 
they had more satisfactory training in anti-submarine warfare. The spring of 1943 marked 
a permanent change in the Battle of the Atlantic. After an abysmal month in March, 
where German U-Boats destroyed thousands of tons of cargo, Allied forces sank a 
significant number of submersibles. From May 1943 until the end of the war, the German 
submersibles struggled to make an impact on Allied shipping.  
 The Battle of the Atlantic, in the context of the entire war, represented one of the 
main obstacles before the invasion of Europe. The retreat of Admiral Doenitz’s U-Boat 
army not only demonstrated the importance of well-trained aviators but it allowed for 
Allied ground forces to advance against the Axis powers. The opening of sea-lanes in the 
Atlantic permitted the transportation of troops and equipment to England to prepare for 
the invasion of Europe.1 Secondly, the enormous amount of ships, planes, funds, and 
overall effort associated in anti-submarine warfare soon helped other operations, like the 
                                                
1 Richard Hough, 306. 
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impending attack on France.2 Training may not have won the Battle of the Atlantic single 
handedly, but without the improvement of pilots, who conducted Atlantic patrols, the 
Germans would have enjoyed a more one-sided battle.  
                                                
2 Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1: The Battle of the Atlantic, 
402. 
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 “CIVILIAN PILOTS AID IN SINKING U-BOATS,” The New York Times, April 20,  
1942. http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimesindex/docview/106429203/ 
139DA60 1FF22 EA58B67/1?accountid=15131 (accessed October 18, 2012). 
 
This article comments on the use of civilian pilots to help the Navy and the Army 
Air Force in patrolling the Atlantic Coast of the United States. It gives 
information on the effectiveness of these new pilots. These civilians scared the 
German U-Boats into submerging. This retreat allowed for many merchant 
vessels to safely reach their destination. This article helps me argue that training 
was not necessary in saving Allied cargo ships during the war. It can be argued 
that technology had little affect on saving ships because these civilian pilots were 
helping patrol the coastline with civilian planes. I will use this document when I 
differentiate between the destruction of the U-Boats in the Atlantic to the amount 
of cargo that was sunk during the war. 
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, November 1942: Monthly Intelligence  
Report, November 1942, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
This report, created by the Army Air Force Submarine Command, analyzes 
significant changes in Anti-submarine operations throughout the Atlantic Ocean. 
This document received its raw data from top-secret sources and all combat crews 
and their organizations are allowed to read this report. This summary explains one 
of the most damaging months against the allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. This 
intelligence report describes the submersible situation in November and the 
previous months. In these reports there are operational records of Allied aircraft, 
theories of German strategies and stories of attacks on submersibles, including the 
successes and failures of these strikes. For my I.S. I will use this document to 
explain the situation the allies were in at the end of 1942. It was during this time 
that the U-Boats were giving Allied shipping the most trouble. These months 
caused President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to give top priority to 
the Battle of the Atlantic. Although this summary is not as extensive as the 
intelligence reports in 1943, there is still useful information. One of the chapters 
writes about individual stories of attacks on submersibles. These reports are 
described to tell pilots what has worked and what has not when attacking U-
Boats. The topics described are the use of camouflage, the distance before 
attacking and the height of an attack.  
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, December 1942: Monthly Intelligence  
Report, December 1942, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
This document follows November in the description of anti-submarine operations 
in the Atlantic. Like the other months, I will use the statistics provided in this 
report to show the reader the progresses made in anti-submarine warfare. This 
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month is specifically useful in my I.S. because it talks about the commission of 
the 18th squadron. This unit was created for operational training. This squadron 
trained aircrews in the initial aspects of anti-submarine operations. This document 
describes the need for a training squadron because commanding officers had to 
waste time in helping their pilots learn the basics of attacking U-Boats. This does 
not mean that pilots were not expected to learn on the job. This chapter goes on to 
tell commanding officers that they need to keep up to date with changes in 
attacking that are more efficient.  
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, January 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report,  
January 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
The January Monthly Summary looks at the sinking of merchant ships, offensive 
tactics, defensive tactics, the use of aircraft, and new technologies during the 
month. From these observations, the report explains any possible reasons for 
shifts in statistics from the previous month. This primary source allows me to 
examine anti-submarine operations before the spring offensive in 1943. It is 
essential to see how the Submarine Command viewed the role of aircraft and 
training when it seemed like the U-Boats were almost nonexistent in the Atlantic. 
It was during this time that Admiral Doenitz ordered most of his U-Boats to come 
home to repair and rearm. This source is useful in my I.S. for many reasons. First, 
the monthly summary states that the Submarine Command realized how important 
aircraft are in the protection of convoys. Land based aircraft were able to protect 
American coastal waters effectively, which forced the U-Boats to operate in the 
mid-Atlantic. Finally, this source describes new technologies developed for 
aircrews to find and sink a spotted submersible. In the explanations for the proper 
use of these technologies it is obvious that the operator must be well trained in the 
use of this equipment. 
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, February 1943: Monthly Intelligence  
Report, February 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
This report by the Army Air Force Submarine Command analyzes the increase in 
U-Boat attacks during the month of February. In January, the Mid-Atlantic Gap 
region lost 2 merchant ships to U-Boats totaling a little of 20,000 tons. In 
February the same area lost 31 merchant ships totaling nearly 200,000 tons. This 
report is very useful in my I.S. since this document talks about the importance of 
training in sinking of submersibles. Specifically, this source states that to increase 
the amount of U-Boats sunk, the Submersible Command needs more long range 
aircraft, improved technology, and improved technique. The improved technique 
can be reached by an increase in training. The report goes on to give an example 
of bombing errors by pilots when a submersible is spotted. The bomb itself is 
lethal; the problem is that it is dropped too far from the submersible to be 
effective. This issue can be fixed by having more experienced pilots, either with 
more missions flown, or proper training. The document goes on to quote the 
commanding officer of the 26th Anti-submarine Squadron on training when he 
said, “This kind of training boosts combat crew morale tremendously.” Finally, 
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the Intelligence Report describes the training facilities in use. The training 
facilities are improperly supplied to provide their crews with realistic targets. This 
caused a delay in training for most stations. Some even had to revert to using a 
trailer as a target. 
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, March 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report,  
March 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
This primary source summarizes anti-submarine operations during the last 
effective month of U-Boat operations against Allied merchant vessels in the 
Battle of the Atlantic. It is in this month that people started to worry about the 
current strategy and the German U-Boats. Oddly enough, the month of March was 
not the worst month for the Allies. May, June and November of 1942 lost more 
tonnage than in March 1943. The Allied worry came from the fact that in January 
1943 the amount of supplies lost were less than at any point in 1942. This report 
is key in my I.S. since it describes the problems of poorly trained aviators. Also 
these planes needed to be able to properly detect and attack a German 
submersible. Flying a plane over the U-Boat would hinder an attack on an Allied 
convoy, but it would be the destruction of the U-Boats that would cause Doenitz 
to rethink his entire operation. Specifically this detailed report explains that 41% 
of aircraft attacks fail to even hit the U-Boats, while only 5% of attacks will sink 
one. Most importantly, this report has a four-page chapter on why recent attacks 
on U-Boats failed. There are many reasons why attacks failed, but a large amount 
of errors were noted as preventable if there was proper training. These examples 
include bombing errors, attack time, and coordination.    
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, April 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report,  
April 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
This primary source looks at the anti-submarine campaign in the Atlantic during 
April. During this month, merchant vessels lost decreased significantly. In March 
we saw an extreme amount of lost cargo in the Atlantic, while in April cargo ships 
were more protected. During this time we see the use of an ‘Air Umbrella’ in the 
Atlantic. This strategy has air covering Atlantic convoys through their entire trip 
to England. This source specifically talks about the growing use of hunter-killer 
groups. These groups of aircraft do not treat the convoy as bait, waiting for a U-
Boat to attack. They instead, fly to areas of high submersible concentrations and 
look to sink them. The theory of this strategy is that if less U-Boats are in the 
Atlantic there would be less merchant vessels sunk. This report is useful in my 
I.S. because it allows me to follow the statistics regarding the submersible war in 
1943. Of these numbers, I will use the amount of merchant vessels sunk, U-Boats 
spotted, and U-Boats sunk during this month.  
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Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, May 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report,  
May 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
Following the pattern, this report analyzes the anti-submarine campaign in May. 
May is a very important month when looking at the Battle of the Atlantic. It was 
during this time that Allied forces were consistently sinking German U-Boats. In 
May Allied aircraft made 193 attacks on U-Boats, much more than the 133 in 
April. When looking at the statistics, the amount of U-Boats successfully attacked 
in March is not much different than in May. The significant fact is that in March 
most of the attacks were noted as probable slight damage, while in May most of 
the attacks were recorded as known sunk. It was in May that aircrews were 
figuring out how to attack the German submersibles. Due to the improved 
destruction of U-Boats, this intelligence reported that this was the first month that 
the amount of submersibles sunk were higher than the rate of German 
submersibles being built.  
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, June 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report,  
June 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
At the time of this report, the Battle of the Atlantic was in its final stages. The 
German U-Boats were more cautious in attacking and because of this the amount 
of merchant vessels lost were very low. Even with this worry by the Germans, 
Allied aircraft sunk the same amount of submersibles as in May. The difference 
was that in May the amount of submersible sighted was much higher than in June. 
These pilots had the skill to properly detect and attack these U-Boats. For my I.S. 
this report describes the history of aircraft in the Battle of the Atlantic. 
Specifically, this source states that because the allies were unprepared to fight the 
U-Boats, a lot of their methods were primitive. It took the allies several months to 
even realize the potential of aircraft in the Atlantic. Once aircrews were seen as a 
possible solution to the submersible situation, it took them months for them to be 
at their full potential. The report states that one of the reasons for their success 
was the training of crews in specific techniques that could only be discovered 
through experience.  
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, July 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report, July  
1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
Although July did not have the same significance in the Battle of the Atlantic as 
in May, the importance of aircrews is evident in this report. Unlike in June, U-
Boat commanders were forced to risk their ships in order to sink enemy vessels. It 
was in July that this strategy was a two-edged sword. U-Boats sunk more 
merchant vessels than in June but at a cost. Twenty-seven U-Boats were classified 
as sunk compared to the six in June. This source also stated how the ratio of 
merchant vessels sunk compared to U-Boats sunk was .9. In 1942 the average was 
over nine ships lost for every U-Boat destroyed. This document has a chart to 
explain the importance of aircraft in the sinking of submersibles. It shows that in 
January and February of 1943 the amount of U-Boats sunk by aircraft incredibly 
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low compared to the previous six months. In March it was at its peak, but still 
aircraft were not destroying as many submersibles as was thought by the high 
command. The next few months, the percentage stayed high but the amount of 
sunken U-Boat rose dramatically. The effectiveness of aircraft from May to July 
is explained because in March and April the percentage of U-Boats sank after an 
attack were only six percent while in July the number rose to twenty-five percent. 
It is entirely possible that these numbers are an exaggeration there was still an 
obvious rise in the efficiency of anti-submarine operations. The report gives some 
credit to these numbers on the training of aircrews along with proper 
technologies.  
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, August 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report,  
August 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/. 
 
This last intelligence report I intend to look at gives a broad summary on the 
Battle of the Atlantic. It is obvious by the allies that the battle to protect their 
cargo is over. The August summary describes the past few months of anti-
submarine operations. With the increased loss of U-Boats, less of them were 
ordered to patrol those waters. The North Atlantic was one of the most dangerous 
places for convoys in March but in August these waters were one of the safest in 
the Atlantic. For my I.S. I intend to use that information to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of aircraft. This report also compares U-Boats sunk, merchant 
vessels sunk, U-Boats attacked and U-Boats at sea for 1943. This information will 
allow me to look at the situations in the Atlantic over the past several months.  
Arnold, H.H. First Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the  
Secretary of War. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947. 
 
This is the first of three reports regarding the Army Air Forces in the Second 
World War. This document explains the role that Army Air Forces had 
throughout the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. General Arnold first describes the 
individual pieces that make up his air force. He talks about the women air corps, 
weather services, etc. Then he goes on to giving information on his aircrews in 
over Europe and the Japanese islands. This source is useful to my I.S. because it 
gives details about the training system from 1940 until 1944. The Army Air 
Force, like many other military groups was low on equipment to properly train 
their pilots. He compares the session to training someone how to swim by using a 
glass of water. Only after months of waiting and improvisation did these facilities 
have the necessary amount of planes and other equipment. This report goes on to 
say that about a third of the equipment of the Army Air Force was used for 
training purposes. This shows the importance training had in World War II 
because the need to prepare new cadets outweighed the need to have combat 
crews fully supplied. 
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Hurd, Charles. “U-BOAT RAIDS CHALLENGE TECHNIQUES OF OUR NAVY,” The New  
York Times, May 31, 1942. http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimesindex 
/docview/106145302/139DA2FFDB326E557CB/1?accountid=15131 (accessed October 
18, 2012). 
 
This newspaper article, written during the U-Boats’ unhindered destruction of 
American cargo, talks about the problems of the Navy and why they are not able 
to protect the American coastline. Specifically, this source gives the broad answer 
that convoy ships and patrol aircraft are not in quantities necessary to become an 
effective force. The document cannot go in more detail because of the censorship 
at the time, but even this information is helpful in my I.S. Training facilities were 
under equipped to give their pilots a realistic experience. This can be attributed to 
the fact that once a new plane is completed, it is sent to the front where it is badly  
needed.   
 
Admiral King, Ernest J. on the state of the Navy from peacetime until 1944. Our Navy at  
War March 27, 1944. 
 
Admiral King writes about the Navy and its operations before March 1944. This 
official report is a great source to see how the Navy changed and prepared for its 
involvement in World War II. Included in this source are charts that show 
increases in personnel and equipment. One part of this document that gives 
information for my I.S. topic is the section on anti-submarine operations. King 
explains how he is unable to go into full detail about the tactics used to destroy 
the U-Boat because the war is still going on. However, he does give a good 
amount of explanation into the situation right after Pearl Harbor and the growth of 
Naval air power. The section on anti-submarine warfare starts by stating the 
general strategies and impact of the submersible war before the U.S. entered. 
Once America was forced to declare war, King explains how the Navy did not 
have the necessary forces to protect the entire coastline. He later states the 
subsequent successes of the U-Boat in the sinking of merchant cargo. The Civil 
Air Patrol is mentioned as doing a great service for the United States but they 
cannot handle the power of the German submersible force. He finally states how 
the in May 1942 anti-submarine forces were being trained and the Army Air 
Force organized a command for this job specifically. From this information it is 
easy to argue that one of the reasons why submersibles were victorious on the 
American coast in the first half of 1942 was because pilots were either not their or 
they were not trained for the special task for hunting U-Boats. 
 
Lewis, Charles F. CMDR Flying Seaplanes for the Navy During World War II 1941- 
1945: The PBM Martin Mariner 1997. 
 
This autobiography details Charles Lewis’ life as a Naval Aviator during the 
Second World War. Lewis writes about his young adult life immediately before 
the Second World War, his training, and his combat missions. This incredible 
source gives me information about specific maneuvers he conducted in each stage 
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of his training. This source also shows the emotion and thoughts of a cadet during 
his training. These descriptions will undoubtedly aide in my fourth chapter on the 
training programs. 
Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol.  
1, The Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939- May 1943. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1947. 
 
Samuel Morison, a professor at Harvard University, wanted to write about a 
historical event while it was happening. He thought that too many histories were 
being written after the fact and many eyewitnesses have moved on. Once Japan 
attacked the U.S. at Pearl Harbor, Morison went to President Roosevelt and was 
granted involvement in the war with his specific writing assignment. It should be 
noted that Morison’s writings follow the Navy’s perspective in the war. He writes 
about the first half of World War II and how America faced the growing problem 
of the German U-Boats. Morison describes how the Second World War impacted 
America’s Navy. In 1939 and 1940 the United States government started to 
prepare for war. Soon after the Navy started to engage the Axis powers, even 
though they had not declared war on Germany or Japan. This book then goes on 
to describe different frontiers that engaged German submersibles in 1942. This 
information, along with the chapters that talked about the organization and the 
auxiliary forces in the conflict, is extraordinarily helpful in my independent study. 
At the beginning of the war the Navy was undersized. The Army Air Force picked 
up the slack for the Navy and created the Army Anti-submarine Air Command. 
This group was not the only one that operated in the Atlantic. The Civil Air Patrol 
consisted of men unfit for combat who flew private planes to search for any 
submersibles. These facts will help me throughout my I.S. and I plan on using this 
source in all four of my chapters. This source also gives details on the Battle of 
the Atlantic that will help me discover new sources for further research.  
Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol.  
10, The Atlantic Battle Won: May 1943- May 1945. Boston: Little Brown And 
Company, 1956. 
 
This book, also written by Samuel Morison, goes into more detail on the Battle of 
the Atlantic. He talks briefly about the training situation and the creation of air 
universities in 1943, the attacks on the Bay is Biscay and the German strategies 
during the battle. This source is important in my I.S. because of the few pages on 
aircraft training, the summaries of convoys in April and May of 1943 and the 
operations throughout the Atlantic Ocean. For training, Morison writes about the 
organization of training stations in 1943 and the creation of the Tenth Fleet. The 
Tenth Fleet became the Naval unit established for antisubmarine operations. He 
then describes the protection for convoy ONS-5. This convoy was one of the first 
examples of the allies taking control of the Battle of the Atlantic. It was in this 
convoy that 51 U-Boats were deployed and only a handful of merchant vessels 
were lost. 
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Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy  
in the Second World War Boston: Little, Brown And Company, 1963. 
 
This source, like the previous two books, gives details on the Battle of the 
Atlantic from a Naval perspective. This book talks in great detail about the early 
situation of Antisubmarine units, including the effects of the large sinking of 
cargo ships in 1943. It is this information that is useful in my I.S. because it 
allows me to see the impact of the submersible war over time.    
Morse, Philip M. “The Beginnings of Operations Research in the United States,”  
Operations Research 34, no. 1 January 1986. 
 
The lead scientist of the Anti Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group 
wrote this article and it was this organization that studied and analyzed the U-
Boat war. Philip Morse and his team read through after action reports in the Navy 
and even sent scientists to work as field agents so they could witness the problems 
first hand. This document explains the history of operations research in America 
and it also describes the U-Boat menace in the first couple years of World War II. 
Specifically, this article states that the Navy was reluctant to hire civilians to help 
them, until the U-Boat started their destruction of East Coast shipping. The Battle 
of the Atlantic was getting out of hand and looking at Britain’s use of scientists, 
America was ready to start studying their failures. Morse also writes how even 
though they can calculate the proper range and effectiveness of a piece of 
equipment, his scientists noticed how the crews themselves became another factor 
to take into consideration. Finally this document talks about the process the 
scientists went through to obtain their data. 
Roosevelt, Franklin. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, ed.  
Francis Loewenheim. New York: E.P. Dutton & CO., Inc, 1975. 
 
When looking at the seriousness and its overall significance of any conflict, the 
opinions and worries of the country’s leaders helps the reader see the impact an 
event had on a nation. This book features the conversations between President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. This source allows for me to show the 
scarcity of resources of the Allies at the beginning of the war. Roosevelt 
comments how the United States can no longer aid Great Britain because the Axis 
powers were forcing America to move closer and closer to war.  
 
Syrett, David. History of the Anti-submarine Measures of the Tenth Fleet. November  
1981. TS Washington D.C.: Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical 
Center. 
 
The Tenth Fleet, activated in May 1943, was created to coordinate naval anti-
submarine operations in the Atlantic. This document also gives basic details on an 
anti-submarine measures for the Battle of the Atlantic. Specifically this source 
gives information on the Air Anti-submarine Development Detachment Atlantic 
Fleet and the Anti-submarine Attack Teacher Unit Plan. The development 
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detachment was mainly a research-based organization and was used to find how 
to effectively use current resources to sink U-Boats. The teaching unit was 
implemented as a way to properly refresh aircrews on anti-submarine operations. 
This document is useful in my I.S. since it talks about the naval developments in 
anti-submarine operations.  
 
Secondary Sources 
Air Historical Office, Organization of AAF Training Facilities: 1939-1945. Army Air  
Force Historical Studies 53, June 1946. 
 
This document explains the changes made in the Army Air Corps and the Army 
Air Force in their command structures during the Second World War. In the early 
years of World War II, the Army Air Corps started to decentralize their 
organization. Once America entered the Second World War, the Army Air Force 
effectively reorganized its commands, which includes training. For my I.S., this 
source describes the complexities of working in an organization that has been 
decentralized. In some cases flight officers had no knowledge of the training 
exercises that took place.  
 
Air Historical Office. Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF: 1939-1945. Army Air  
Force Historical Studies 61, August 1949. 
  
This source gives information on the training that Army Air Force pilots 
experienced during the Second World War. Along with that description, this 
source also explains the struggles the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force had 
with the rapid increase of cadets to their training facilities. Specifically, the Army 
Air Force explains how they cannot properly train their current cadets because of 
the United States’ need for more operational pilots.  
 
Archer, William. The Pirate’s Progress: A Short History of the U-Boat. New York:  
Harper & Brothers Publishers 1918. 
 
This book describes the U-Boat campaigns during the First World War. William 
Archer explains the advantages of the submarine and how it surprised the Allies 
in the first few years of World War I. For my I.S. this source states the impressive 
capabilities of the U-Boat however it also explains that the submarine needed 
further development to reach its full potential. The U-Boats thirty years later also 
needed more advancement to defeat the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. 
 
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, The Antisubmarine  
Command. Army Air Force Historical Studies 107, April 1945. 
 
This document describes the history and operation of the Antisubmarine 
Command of the Army Air Force. The Antisubmarine Command held the 
responsibility of patrolling the Atlantic Ocean against the German U-Boats. 
Learning the specifics of the command helped me in explaining the usefulness of 
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this organization during the Second World War. The creation of this command 
improved the previous unit in charge of anti-submarine operations. Specifically, 
this source details the training that pilots went through and also the pilots that 
comprised of the Antisubmarine Command. This document allows me to explain 
the effectiveness of an organization devoted to hunting the U-Boats. Since the 
pilots in this Command came from the unit that previously patrolled the Atlantic, 
the staff knew many specifics of this kind of warfare. Also pilots in this 
organization had more precise training in anti-submarine operations. 
 
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, Initial Selection of  
Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier, and Navigator Training. Army Air Force 
Historical Studies 2, November 1943. 
 
This study looked at the Army Air Force’s methods of selecting Americans to 
enlist as cadets. This document details the test given to potential cadets and the 
statistics of how many pilots the Army Air Force selects in a given year. This 
source helps my final I.S. chapter because it states that the Army Air Force 
changed their test for potential pilots during the Second World War. Instead of 
earlier written test, which consisted of a variety of questions, the new examination 
system asked the student questions that dealt with flying situations. Thus, the 
accepted cadets had a better working knowledge of flying situations before they 
even took off in a plane.  
 
Baxter 3rd, James Phinney. Scientists Against Time. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,  
1946. 
 
This book describes the contributions that scientists made during the Second 
World War. The majority of this book summarizes the technologies that scientists 
created during the war. From radar to flamethrowers to anti malaria drugs, 
scientists brought research and analysis into motion. Besides this additive for the 
Allies, these scientists also researched the proper ways to use new and existing 
technologies. For my I.S. I will use the parts on the improvement in techniques 
that needed to be mastered by the military personnel operating them.  
 
 
Buell, Dr. Harold L. “Elimination Base Training – 1941” Naval Aviation Museum  
Foundation. Vol 8. No. 2 Fall 1987 73-79. Publisher mislabeled Vol 9. No. 1 
 
This article gives information on the elimination bases at the beginning of the 
Second World War. Specifically, the author gives his account of the training he 
went through before he became an aviation cadet. I intend to use this account as a 
way to describe how Naval Reservists worked to change their status in the Navy 
to be Naval Aviators.  
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Bureau of Aeronautics. Naval Aviation 1943. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute  
1943.  
  
This book contains information of Naval Aviation in 1943. This source replaced 
the book Naval Aviation 1934 and details the organization, history and training of 
personnel in 1943. For my Independent Study the organizational facts and training 
stages paints a clear picture on Naval Aviation during the Second World War. 
This book goes step by step of Naval training, including what the cadets learned 
and for how long they practiced these procedures before moving on to the next 
class. All of these facts will help my second chapter, which deals with the 
organization of the Navy and the training curriculum during World War II. 
 
Bureau of Naval Personnel. Navy Wings. Washington D.C.: U.S. Navy Training  
Publications Center, 1955. 
 
This book describes the history of Naval Aviation including its development, 
organization and training program. From the origins of Naval Aviation until the 
War in Korea, this book talks about the changes of this growing field and the 
challenges of the Navy in different moments in time. For my I.S. the chapters on 
the training program contain information valuable for my second chapter. 
Specifically, the establishment of a civilian training program shows the United 
States’ commitment to improving their pilots before they go off to war.  
 
Cant, Gilbert. America’s Navy in World War II. New York: John Day Company. 1943. 
 
This book describes the Navy’s role in World War II. Specifically, Cant writes 
mostly about Naval operations in the Pacific Theater, but he does dedicate some 
time to the Atlantic campaigns. Cant’s detailed work on the Atlantic Front will be 
quite helpful in my research. He first explains the early U-Boat operations in the 
Atlantic but then goes on to state how anti-submarine warfare was treated as a 
secondary mission only when Naval forces were not needed in the primary 
operations. He also talks about the situation on the Atlantic Coast. This shows the 
United States’ failures early in World War II. Finally this book gives information 
on the establishment and friction of the Army and Naval aviation branches. 
 
Carlisle, Norman. The Air Forces Reader: Army and Navy Air Forces. Indianapolis: The  
Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1944. 
 
This book compiles several different aspects of flying in the Second World War 
and details different situations of the pilots. The source examines the war over 
Europe, Japan and even the Atlantic. Specifically this book describes the training 
regiment of pilots in the U.S. Navy and Army Air Force. I intend on utilizing this 
book when I have to explain the specific programs that pilots went through before 
they became operational aviators. 
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Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). United States Naval Administration in World  
War II Volume XIV: Aviation Training, 1940-1945. Washington D.C.: Naval 
Historical Center. 
 
This book examines the changes in aviation training by the Navy during the 
Second World War. The source describes the administrative changes of the 
training programs. For My I.S. I intend to use the first chapter, on the 
administrative organization of the Naval Air training program. This chapter 
focuses on the efforts for the Navy to centralize its commands pertaining to 
training. Specifically the statement from the Committee on Naval Affairs of the 
House of Representatives demonstrates how the current administrative 
organization of the Naval districts has hindered the training of pilots in the U.S. 
Navy. 
 
Daso, Dik Alan. Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower. Washington:  
Smithsonian Institution Press. 2000. 
 
This book gives biographical information on Hap Arnold, the commanding 
General of the Army Air Forces, and information on the development of 
American air power. As the General of the Army Air Forces he was in charge of 
their new responsibility to fight U-Boats on America’s coastline. This source 
gives information on Arnold’s decision to create an operational analysis unit to 
research the most effective ways on attacking submersibles. This book is useful in 
my project because it gives reasons why operational analysis was both a practical 
and powerful method of improving one’s forces.    
 
Gannon, Michael. Operation Drumbeat. New York: Harper and Row Publishers. 1990. 
 
This book looks at U-Boat 123 on its voyages to the American coast in 1942. This 
source shows the German experience in the attack on merchant vessels. I intend to 
use this source to see the changes in anti-submarine operations from their first 
voyage in early 1942 and their last mission in the middle of 1942. I can also read 
about the reaction of the German sailors while they were operating in the Western 
portion of the Atlantic. For my I.S. I will use this book specifically because it 
describes the end of Operation Drumbeat. The U-Boat forces were ordered to 
operate in safer waters towards the end of 1942. Gannon writes about the use of 
operational analysis and how during these later months trained men were 
beginning to work towards sinking the German submersibles. 
Hough, Richard. The Longest Battle. New York: William Morrow and Company Inc,  
1986. 
 
This book not only studies the navies that fought in the Battle of the Atlantic but 
in the entire Ocean war from 1939 – 1945. This source describes the reactions and 
strategies of the higher commands and the ordinary seaman during this long 
conflict. For my I.S, this book gives valuable information on the background of 
 91 
the Battle of the Atlantic. This includes the naval situation of each power at the 
onset of war and the tactics of each side.  
 
Commander Karig, Walter USNR, Lieutenant Burton, Earl USNR and Lieutenant  
Stephen L. Freeland USNR. Battle Report: The Atlantic War. New York: Rinehart 
and Company Inc. 1946. 
 
This book gives the history of the Atlantic operations during the Second World 
War. From America’s first missions in the Atlantic Ocean in 1940 to the capture 
of Cherbourg in 1944, this source describes the changing situation. For my 
Independent Study, the chapter of the anti-submarine war gives me useful 
information on the movement of the American Navy from a powerless force in 
the Atlantic to an effective submersible organization. Specifically the authors 
wrote about the Tenth Fleet and how the Navy organized this new fleet dedicated 
to anti-submarine operations. 
 
Kennet, Lee. The First Air War: 1914-1918. New York: The Free Press. 1991. 
 
This source details the beginnings of the airplane in a combat setting. Along with 
a description of the technology, this book explains how the men trained to use the 
airplanes and how they fought in Europe. For my I.S., explaining the roots of air 
combat and technology will help in arguing that the Allies needed to focus on 
training because the airplane entered the twentieth century as untested technology.  
 
Mason, David. U-Boat the Secret Menace. New York: Ballantine Books Inc. 1968 
 
This source details U-Boat operations throughout the Atlantic Ocean. It then puts 
the entire war into perspective to give the reader a detailed history of World War 
II and what the submersibles were up against. This book gives a lot of information 
on the successes of the U-Boat offensive known as Operation Drumbeat in 1942. 
Mason’s descriptions allow me to write about the American failure to prepare for 
an anti-submarine conflict. An extensive narrative is necessary to give the reader 
an overview into the Battle of the Atlantic so they can better understand the 
complexities of this theater of war. All of that information will make it far easier 
to explain the tactics and techniques pilots needed to learn in order to sink a U-
Boat. 
 
McCloskey, Joseph “British Operational Research in World War II” Operations  
Research 35, no. 3 (1987).  
 
This article gives information on the growth of operations research in both the 
Atlantic campaign for Great Britain. Following the development and the impact of 
the anti-submarine operations group I see the importance of civilian scientists for 
the U.S. and British Navy. This source states the many bases these scientists went 
to and the relationship between American scientists and those in England. Finally 
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this document goes on to state the history of the Tenth Fleet. This division in the 
Navy was created to centralize anti-submarine operations in the Atlantic.  
Milner, Marc. Battle of the Atlantic. Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2003. 
 
This secondary source gives a general history on the Battle of the Atlantic. For 
my Independent Study, I intend to use book to describe different parts of the U-
Boat war. From the beginning of the war in Europe, off the coast of England, to 
America’s entrance, off the United States’ Eastern coast, the impact of the 
German U-Boat was immense. This information will allow me to explain the 
effects of the Battle of the Atlantic. 
 
Office of Air Force Hsitory. The Army Air Forces in World War II  
Volume I: Plans & Early Operations January 1939 to August 1942. ed. Craven, 
Wesley Frank and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1948. 
 
This book gives a detailed history of the Army Air Force from 1939 until August 
1942. This source gives information on the inception of the American Air Corps, 
its changes in organization, preparation for war and finally its early operations 
against the Axis powers. One chapter in this book that I will give a lot of attention 
to is the Battle of the Atlantic. The authors write about the differences of 
jurisdiction and training between the Army and Navy Air Forces. They also go on 
to state the Army Air Force’s changes when asked to protect American shipping 
and also it’s impact on the U-Boat war. This book is a great source for my 
research because of the chronological detail of the Army Air Force, and its anti-
submarine operations. Specifically, it describes the Army Air Force’s readiness to 
fight submersibles. They were not trained at all in dealing with U-Boats yet they 
were expected to fight them. At the beginning of the war the Navy’s lack of 
resources forced the Army Air Force units to fight on their behalf. Also, the units 
equipped to destroy U-Boats were trained in the Army Air Force’s primary 
function of bombing area and little practice was given to anti-submarine patrol. 
Next, not only were trained Naval aviators sent to the Pacific but also trained 
Army aviators were sent to the West coast of the United States. While the AAF 
pilots knew how to bomb specific areas, the bombing techniques for anti-
submarine operations were very different than bombing land based targets, thus 
the U-Boats had little to worry about.  
 
Office of Air Force History. The Army Air Forces in World War II Volume II: Europe:  
Torch to Pointblank August 1942 to December 1943. Ed. Craven, Wesley Frank 
and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1949. 
  
This book, like the first volume, gives a detailed history of the Army Air Forces 
in World War II. This volume in particular gives information from August 1942 
until the end of 1943. This source describes the Army Air Force’s operations in 
Europe, specifically, in Italy, Africa and in the Atlantic. For my I.S. the chapter 
on anti-submarine warfare is ideal for my research. The authors write about the 
improvements of the Army Air Force units later in the war against the U-Boats. 
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Philpott, William. Three Armies on the Somme: The First Battle of the Twentieth  
Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2010. 
 
This book looks at the Battle of the Somme in the First World War and a brief 
history in the years before and after. Specifically, the author explains the history 
of the tank and its first use during the Great War. This information helps describe 
the growth of technology in the twentieth century and how the tank, like all new 
technology between 1914 and 1918 required improvement.  
 
Pomeroy, Colin A. The Flying Boats of Bermuda. Canada: Colin Pomeroy. 2000. 
  
This book looks at the history of the aircrafts used in Bermuda. Specifically this 
book details different operational missions in Bermuda. For my I.S. I plan on 
using the extensive information on each individual flying boat the Naval Aviators 
flew during the Second World War. This information includes the crew size, 
distance, and armament of each plane, which will give the reader and myself basic 
knowledge of the planes I plan on writing about. 
 
Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. New  
York: Harper Perennial, 2011. 
 
This book gives a general history on the Second World War. This compelling 
novel describes complex aspects of each campaign in a fluid and simple way 
without losing any necessary data. The chapter on the Battle of the Atlantic gives 
plenty of information perfect for my introduction or any introductory paragraph in 
my I.S. Also this source gives many quotes from famous characters in the war that 
demonstrate different themes of this violent war. 
 
Roskill, Captain S.W.The War At Sea 1939-1945 vol. II, The Period of Balance. London:  
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956. 
 
This secondary source gives a general history on not only the Battle of the 
Atlantic but on any sea engagement during the Second World War. For my I.S. 
the information Roskill gives on the invasion of German U-Boats on the 
American coastline helps paint a picture about the bleak situation for Allied 
military personnel and civilians in the first few months on 1942. Specifically the 
data printed in the appendices at the end of the book explains the changes in 
strength of both forces throughout the war. It is the information that I plan to use 
directly in my first chapter. 
 
Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare 1940-1977: Volume 1 1940-1960. Virginia:  
R.F. Cross Associates, LTD, 1978. 
 
This source talks about the history of anti-submarine operations by the Navy from 
the Second World War until the Korean War. This source writes about the planes 
and operations of aviators in anti-submarine operations. For my I.S. this source 
gives a lot of background information on sea-based missions and development, 
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however, I intend on only using their description of the organization of anti-
submarine operations. This source details the Navy’s push for complete control in 
the Atlantic Ocean with their creation of the Tenth Fleet in 1943. Specifically, the 
Navy writes about the problems they have had in dealing with joint control with 
the Army Air Force. 
Stegall, Eugene E. “Training the Primary Flight Instructors in World War II” Naval  
Aviation Museum Foundation. vol 5 no 1. Spring 1984. 27-34. 
  
This article describes how the Navy trained their instructors in primary flight 
training. This source helps me detail who the Navy chose as teachers during the 
Second World War in Naval Aviation. These men helped the cadets learn how to 
properly fly their aircraft. 
 
Sternhell, Charles and Alan Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II,  
Washington, D.C., 1946. 
 
This book describes the operational evaluation of anti-submarine warfare during 
the Second World War. The authors dedicate the first half of this source to 
summarize different periods of the Battle of the Atlantic. From 1939 until 1945 
the book explains U-Boat offensives throughout the war and the subsequent 
countermeasures. Under the category of countermeasures the implementation of 
both aircraft and scientific research are brought up. The second part of this book 
sheds light on specific scientific evaluations during the course of the war. The 
descriptions of attack errors and offensive searches have given a large amount of 
information that has been useful in my I.S.  
 
Stewart, Irving. Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of  
the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1948. 
This book explains the implementation of scientific research during World War II. 
This source mainly describes the history and organization of the National Defense 
Research Committee. The sub divisions of the NDRC are also mentioned in this 
book. I will use the information on the organization of the Antisubmarine Warfare 
Operations Research Group, a sub division of the NDRC in my third chapter. 
Along with that description, the book talks about the use of field agents who 
determined problems to analyze, which is essential in my I.S for examining the 
relationship between the training commands and the scientists. 
 
Syrett, David. The Defeat of the German U-Boats. Colombia: University of South  
Carolina Press. 1994. 
 
This book on the Battle of the Atlantic gives most of the credit towards 
technology and implementation for why the allies were able to protect their 
convoys. In Syrett’s eyes, the victory of the Battle of the Atlantic depended on the 
safety of the merchant vessels. He brings up a good point because the German 
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objective was to destroy enough cargo to choke the economy of Britain. For my 
I.S. I will be looking at the destruction, not the defeat of the U-Boats. This book 
does give a narrative on several convoys from April until September 1943, which 
can be helpful if I wanted to describe the situation of American naval personnel in 
the Atlantic. Syrett also gives information on the technologies of the Allied 
aircraft and the changing situation in the Atlantic. Those details will help me in 
understanding the proper chronology of the battle. 
 
The Aviation History Unit, The Navy’s Air War: A Mission Completed New York:  
Harper & Brothers Publishers.  
 
This book details the Navy’s air campaigns in World War II. The Aviation 
History Unit describes the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters of Operations and then 
the civilian forces that helped the war effort. Specifically the author explains the 
improvement of Naval aviation and its readiness at the start of the war. The next 
few chapters detail the operations conducted by Naval pilots. The final section of 
this source talks about the training of Naval aviators. The techniques describes 
here will be incredibly useful in my final chapter of my I.S. 
United States Naval Academy, Naval Operations Analysis. Annapolis: Naval Institute  
Press, 1977. 
 
This book gives information on scientific methods to improve naval officers in 
their decision-making skills. The first few chapters of this source describe the 
history and organization of operations research. With this information, I will write 
about the creation and general procedures of operations analysis by the Navy. 
Further in this source, the explanation of search and patrol research gives my I.S. 
a more detailed look at operations research in the Battle of the Atlantic. 
 
Von der Porten, Edward. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Galahad Books,  
1969. 
  
This book focuses on the history and campaigns on the German Navy in the 
Second World War. This source allows the reader to view the development of this 
highly technical Navy. From the end of World War I the German High Command 
needed to organize their Navy and determine its future. This book moves on to the 
onset of World War and the subsequent areas of operations by the newly 
improved U-Boat. From this information I can write on the German reasoning and 
strategies in each area during the Battle of the Atlantic.  
 
 
Waddington, Professor C.H. O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U- 
Boat. London: Unwin Brothers Limited, 1973. 
 
This source describes the history of Operational research and specific instances 
where this research found solutions to problems in the Second World War. The 
general view of Operational Research is that it allowed for the analysis on how to 
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use instruments of war instead of solely its creation. For my I.S I intend on talking 
about British analysis and specific operations where Operational research helped 
in anti-submarine warfare. 
 
Warnock, Timothy A. Air Power Versus U-Boats. Air Force History and Museums  
Program. 1999. 
 
This government document looks at the use of aircraft in the Battle of the 
Atlantic. This source is useful because it gives a summary of the war against the 
U-Boats for the Army Air Force. Specifically, this document states that the low 
amount of cargo ships sunk in November and December were caused by a redirect 
of submersibles from the North Atlantic to the Mid-Atlantic  
 
Williamson, Ronald M. NAS JAX: An Illustrated History of Naval Air Station  
Jacksonville, Florida. Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Co. 1990. 
 
This book describes the history of the Naval Air Station at Jacksonville, Florida. 
Included in this history is the operations conducted on the base. This source writes 
about the Navy’s commission of the Naval Air Station, the social lives of the 
cadets, the operational history on the base, and a general history of the base year 
by year form 1940 until the present day. For my I.S. the operational history gives 
an immense amount of information pertaining to training and how the base 
prepared for war. Specifically this book details the training of the cadets and the 
development of different training programs during the war years. 
 
